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ABSTRACT
Implementation of Economic Sanctions
by
Yoshiharu Kobayashi
This dissertation investigates implementation problems in economic sanctions and
how a state’s concerns about policy implementation a↵ect its decisions and the out-
comes of sanctions. This study builds on the premise that sanctions are carried out by
firms within a sanctioning state, not the state itself. First, using a game-theoretical
model, I show that firms’ non-compliance with sanction policies not only undermines
the e↵ectiveness of unilateral sanctions, but also has a counter-intuitive e↵ect on a
sanctioning state’s decision to impose sanctions. The model suggests that a state is
more likely to impose sanctions when it anticipates firms’ non-compliance. A num-
ber of empirical implications are derived from the model and corroborated with data.
Second, this study also investigates a sanctioning state’s decision to sanction multi-
laterally or unilaterally, and how its expectations about the enforcement of sanctions
influence this decision. When the enforcement of unilateral sanctions is expected to
be di cult, the state is more likely to sanction multilaterally, but only when it has
enough resources and the bureaucratic capability to help other states enforce their
sanctions. The empirical evidence also buttresses these theoretical results. This
study highlights the importance of incorporating expectations about enforcement
into a full understanding of the sanctions processes. The conclusion is that states’
ability to influence firms’ decisions at home as well as abroad is a crucial determinant
of whether they impose, how they design, and the e↵ectiveness of sanctions.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1806, after his major defeat in the Battle of Trafalgar, Napole´on gave up on the
idea of using his military to attack the British and instead decided to attack the
British economy by using businessmen as his warriors. Using his political power, he
introduced decrees known as the Continental System, which became one of the first
instances of using economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool. By forcing all French
allies to cease trade with Britain and coercing any countries that wished to remain
neutral in the war to do the same, Napole´on aimed to create high unemployment
and food shortages in Britain and eventually bring the region in line with the rest
of his empire. Not all businessmen in the empire followed Napole´on’s orders, how-
ever. Using a well-established smuggling network, some firms evaded the system and
kept dealing with the British. Defection by firms severely weakened the Continental
System even before Russia defected in 1810 (Fremont-Barnes & Fisher 2004).
This case is a striking example of one interesting aspect of economic sanctions:
States are often incapable of carrying out sanction policies. Instead, the subnational
economic actors, such as firms, hold the true key. States impose economic sanctions
2to restrict economic and commercial relations with another state, but such interna-
tional relations are in principal conducted by domestic actors. Thus, whether or not
economic sanctions actually inflict economic harm on the target often depends on
the actions and decisions by these domestic actors.
A governments’ dependency on subnational actors in implementing sanction poli-
cies can be problematic for two reasons. First, these actors often do not share the
same preferences as their governments’. While governments impose sanctions to
achieve international objectives, firms make decisions on profit-based motives. Given
the high stakes involved in trade, firms have every reason to use their economic and
political resources to oppose sanction policies. They may do so through lobbying
against proposed sanction policies to curtail their enactment. Alternatively, they
could evade sanction policies through smuggling or simply ignoring such policies,
thereby undermining the e↵ectiveness of the sanctions, as demonstrated in the case
of Napole´on’s Continental System. Second, implementation of sanction policies is
problematic because governments often lack full control over the activities of firms.
These subnational actors are often independent of states, and unless governments
own them, they could make decisions in direct opposition to governmental policies.
These problems can become even more convoluted, as firms can often conceal illicit
activities from the attention of the state.
3This dissertation focuses on one solution to these fundamental problems that
sanctioning governments can adopt. Sanctioning governments typically attempt to
solve this problem by disincentivizing firms from continuing trade with sanctioned
states. They often create specific laws that prohibit their firms from engaging in
economic exchange with sanctioned countries (Morgan & Bapat 2003). Enforcement
of these laws is a crucial aspect of this process. Unless these laws are strictly enforced,
firms would have no incentive to stop trading and abide by sanction policies. Thus, to
ensure compliance by firms, the sanctioning governments must monitor the behavior
of the firms and punish violators.
Though enforcement is a di cult and costly process in most cases, some govern-
ments may not have to be concerned about their firms evading sanctions laws. For
example, when state-owned firms conduct trade, conflicts of interest are less likely
to arise. Moreover, enforcement of sanctions may be less challenging in some cases.
For instance, when certain forms of trade are restricted to a small number of firms,
it is easier for sanctioning governments and their agencies to monitor the behavior
of the firms. Thus, enforcement of sanction policies is often di cult; but, the extent
to which governments must be concerned about it may vary and depend on several
factors.
Building on these insights, the aim of this project is to explore the implications
4of sanction enforcement problems on the states’ decisions to threaten, impose, and
design sanctions. It will also consider how these enforcement problems relate to the
e↵ectiveness of sanctions. The dissertation achieves this aim in several steps. First,
I will introduce a theoretical framework which incorporates enforcement of sanctions
as part of sanction processes, with firms as a strategic actor. Using this model, I
analyze how the behavior of firms a↵ects states’ decisions during sanctions episodes
as well as the outcomes of economic sanctions. Second, I will derive a number of novel
implications from the theory that I subject to empirical tests in later chapters. For
example, the theory identifies how the government’s enforcement capacity should
relate to the impact of their sanctions on trade patterns, e↵ectiveness of sanction
threats, and sender’s decisions to impose sanctions. Third, I conduct a series of
empirical tests to determine whether data support these observable implications from
the theory. Fourth, I synthesize the theoretical insights and empirical findings from
previous chapters to analyze how states design sanctions.
The next section will review the literature on economic sanctions. In reviewing
such literature, I aim to clarify how this study builds on prior work and how it fills
gaps left by others.
51.1 Existing Knowledge and Challenges
In recent decades, states have employed economic sanctions with increasing frequency
to achieve a variety of foreign policy goals, and the projections of the number of eco-
nomic sanctions show strong growth for the future (Elliott & Hufbauer 1999, Heinrich
& Morgan 2008). The trends have been stark. According to the most comprehen-
sive study, the number of economic sanctions has more than doubled every decade
between 1971 and 2000 (Morgan, Bapat & Krustev 2009). While they traditionally
seem a cheap substitute for the use of force, recent history has also demonstrated that
the use of economic sanctions can come at tremendous economic and human cost.
For one, sanctions can impose significant harm on the sender state itself. When the
United States imposed the embargo on grain and superphosphoric acid against the
Soviet Union in 1980, it created $150 million loss for producers of superphosphoric
acid and at least $600 million in losses for producers of farm goods (Hufbauer, Schott
& Elliott 1990). Though these numbers are negligible in terms of the U.S. GNP as a
whole, it inflicted significant loss for producers in specific sectors of the U.S. economy.
Another important aspect of economic sanctions, which has received much attention
from a wide range of audiences in the international community, is that they can
produce severe humanitarian consequences in targeted states (Peksen 2009, Peksen
& Drury 2009, Drury & Peksen N.d., Wood 2008, Allen & Lektzian 2013). For ex-
6ample, when the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed trade sanctions
in response to a military coup in Haiti in 1991, these trade restrictions reportedly
created food shortages and a significant rise in mortality rates. Reports show that
mortality for children between one and four years of age increased 64 percent from
1991 to 1992 (Weiss 1997).
Given the increased use of sanctions as instruments of foreign policy and the
potential costs that they have on both sanctioning and sanctioned states, it is im-
portant to know the extent to which sanctions can succeed in changing the ob-
jectionable behavior of target states and the conditions under which they succeed.
Indeed, most of the existing studies on economic sanctions have investigated these
questions. Early studies of economic sanctions examined high-profile cases such as
the Cuban sanctions and argued that economic sanctions were seldom e↵ective in
coercing the target states to change their policies (e.g. Schreiber 1973, Baer 1973).
A large-N study by Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott (1990) reports that sanctions do
often fail to alter the behavior of target states, but also points out that sanc-
tions can be successful in a sizable minority of the cases. Based on this finding,
scholars, including Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott (1990), have devoted a considerable
amount of e↵ort to identify the conditions under which sanctions succeed in achiev-
ing international objectives (van Bergeijk 1989, Lam 1990, Dashti-Gibson, Davis &
7Radcli↵ 1997, Bonetti 1998, Drury 1998, Drezner 1999, Allen 2005, Hufbauer, Schott,
Elliott & Oegg 2007, Ang & Peksen 2007, Krustev 2010, Early 2011)
A common, general theoretical perspective unites most existing work and knowl-
edge in the literature on this topic: namely, standard analysis of economic sanc-
tions in the bargaining framework. From this perspective, sanctions are conceptu-
alized as a policy instrument that makes disagreement on a disputed policy issue
costly, which allows the sanctioning state to extract a better deal from the sanc-
tioned state when an agreement is reached. This perspective has been useful in
identifying factors that determine the e↵ectiveness of sanctions. The bargaining
perspective suggests that the most basic and important is the costs of sanctions
(disagreement costs) to the target: The higher the costs are, the more likely it is
that sanctions succeed. This basic insight led scholars to examine a number of
factors that influence sanction costs as well as those that determine the target’s
vulnerability to them. For example, some suggested that the key variable determin-
ing sanctions success is whether they are imposed unilaterally or by a multilateral
coalition (Martin 1993, Miers & Morgan 2002, Bapat & Morgan 2009), as multiple
senders should be able to create more severe economic harm to the target than one
sender could. In a similar vein, some argue that “sanction-busting” by third-party
states undermines the e↵ectiveness of sanctions, as it o↵sets the costs of sanctions
8(Hufbauer et al. 2007, Early 2011, Lektzian & Biglaiser 2013). Others have also
suggested that democratic targets or states that are su↵ering internal turmoil are
particularly susceptible to sanctions (Bolks & Al-Sowayel 2000, Brooks 2002, Lek-
tzian & Souva 2007, Allen 2008).
While a number of possible determinants of sanctions e↵ectiveness have been
identified, empirical evidence does not corroborate these hypotheses. For most of
these factors, existing studies provide mixed empirical evidence. Consistent with
this, a recent study by Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi & Morgan (2013) demonstrates
that most of these factors are not robustly related to the success of sanctions. The
best example of this is the long-running debate over whether multilateral sanctions
are more e↵ective than unilateral ones. While there is a widespread belief among
policymakers that multilateral support is necessary to coerce other states to change
their policy behavior, early work interestingly demonstrated that unilateral sanctions
are more e↵ective than multilateral ones (Lam 1990, Bonetti 1998, Dehejia & Wood
1992, van Bergeijk 1994, Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott 1990, Kaempfer & Lowenberg
1999). Although some evidence is put forth to suggest that multilateral sanctions
may be actually more e↵ective than unilateral sanctions (Bapat & Morgan 2009,
Morgan, Bapat & Krustev 2009, McLean & Whang 2010), it still has not been
overwhelming enough to settle this debate.
9This disagreement between theoretical expectations and empirics suggests that
approaching the e↵ectiveness question from the traditional bargaining perspective
may no longer be productive. Indeed, we can find some new approaches proposed
in the literature. One promising approach taken by recent work is to delve much
deeper into the domestic politics behind the working of economic sanctions as well as
decision-making processes through which sanction policies are made, designed, and
implemented (Morgan & Bapat 2003, Whang 2011, Krustev & Morgan 2011, McLean
& Whang 2012, Lektzian & Patterson 2012). These theories pay particular attention
to the roles that subnational actors, such as the public, firms, and interest groups,
play in the context of economic coercion. For example, Whang (2011) and McLean
& Whang (2012) view sanctions as a policy instrument that a sender government
uses to satisfy its domestic constituent groups. More specifically, McLean & Whang
(2012) argue that sanction policies are designed in a way that satisfies both the
general public and special interest groups. When the public pressures policy makers
to impose sanctions, they design sanctions that minimizes economic losses to the
special interest groups. For example, policy makers are more likely to pursue non-
trade restrictions, such as aid sanctions, when the size of export sector increases.
Another theoretical perspective introduced by Bapat & Morgan (2003) addresses
a unique aspect of sanction episodes that has received much less attention from
10
the literature. They point out that the sender government cannot simply choose to
sanction another state and guarantee imposing economic harm. They argue that this
is because domestic economic actors–whose preferences run contrary to that of the
government–often carry out sanction policies. Since the domestic firms are profit-
maximizers, they will continue economic transactions with the target if violation of
sanctions promises to yield positive benefits. In order to deter its domestic firms
from continuing economic exchange with the target, the sender government adopts
sanction policies that disincentivize firms from sanction-busting. Morgan & Bapat
(2003) model this interaction as a game between the sender government that is
trying to influence the policy of the target state through economic sanctions and
the domestic firms within that sender state. The implication from their analysis
is that the e↵ectiveness enforcement of economic sanctions should depend on the
sender governments ability to induce its domestic economic actors to comply with
its sanction policy.
These new theoretical perspectives look promising from a scientific point of view.
First, these theoretical lenses have allowed scholars to identify and analyze previ-
ously unstudied facets of the economic sanction dynamic, such as the design and
enforcement of economic sanctions. For example, the theory proposed by McLean
& Whang (2012) links domestic factors to sanction designs, which has not been
11
examined from the traditional bargaining perspective. Similarly, the theoretical per-
spective introduced by Morgan & Bapat (2003) hypothesizes that firms behavior
should be systematically related to sender’s characteristics such as the level of pun-
ishment specified in its sanctions laws. In the sanctions literature, which has almost
exclusively examined the question of sanctions e↵ectiveness, these new theories have
provided fresh insights and results for the scholarship on economic sanctions.
Second, the explicit formulation of these theories allows for the derivation of a
number of testable implications. Past studies have already proposed several novel
hypotheses, a few of which have been evaluated against data by McLean & Whang
(2012). What is appealing about these theories is the rigor in them, which allows
one to take these models and derive more implications to evaluate. Even more
importantly, the rigor in these theories makes it easy for future work to build on
insights generated from them.
While the recent development in the literature appears promising, it falls short
in two respects. First, many of their implications remain untested against data. The
di culty in testing these lies in the fact that data at the subnational actor level are
not easily accessible. For example, Morgan & Bapat (2003) hypothesizes about the
behavior of firms, but directly testing such hypotheses requires micro data at the firm
level, which are not easily obtainable. Second, existing studies have not su ciently
12
explored how domestic processes behind sanction policies relate to the outcomes of
sanctions. In other words, these theories shed new light on domestic concerns that
sanctioning governments have, but they fail to address how these domestic concerns
may be shaped by and give shape to the international interactions between sanction-
ing and sanctioned states. Addressing this gap is important because the theoretical
developments addressing domestic decision processes cannot be considered progres-
sive until it can explain new domestic dynamics that were previously ignored as well
as what previous models could explain.
There are two approaches to addressing the first problem. One is to collect the
needed micro data so that direct tests are possible. Another way to address this prob-
lem is to extend the theories one step farther by exploring any additional testable
implications in broader international contexts. In this study, I choose the latter ap-
proach not only because a collection of micro-data turned out to be more di cult
than expected, but also because the latter is more conducive to addressing the second
problem in the current literature. To explore how domestic processes influence inter-
national interactions between states and vice-versa, I incorporate new insights from
domestic perspectives into a larger bargaining framework between sanctioning and
sanctioned states. This way, it becomes clear whether a new theory with domestic
processes subsumes existing knowledge. It also becomes clear how new knowledge
13
may di↵er from existing one.
Thus, the purpose of this project is to fill the gaps identified in the current
literature. To this end, I will present a theoretical framework which incorporates
firms and domestic enforcement of sanction policies within the strategic context
between the sender and target. This way, I am able to analyze how firms and sanction
enforcement impact sender and target’s decisions in the process of sanctions. I derive
a number of implications from this theoretical model, which I subject to data.
1.2 The Plan
The underlying premise of this dissertation is that firms are the key actor. When
governments impose sanctions, firms are the ones who are a↵ected the most. In
addition, they do not necessarily have to care about their government’s foreign policy
goals. They are motivated instead by profits. They are also strategic. That is, they
consider what other firms do and what will happen to sanction policies in order to
make decisions about their operations. For these reasons, to understand economic
sanctions, one needs to examine the interactions between the governments and their
firms and understand the costs and incentives the governments and firms face in the
context of sanctions. By focusing on the actors who are arguably most a↵ected by
sanction policies, this dissertation uncovers the unique interactions between firms
14
and sender governments and explores the implications of this relationship in the
strategic context between the sender and target.
The project proceeds in six chapters. Chapter 2 introduces a formal model to
explore the e↵ect of firms’ strategic behavior and government’s enforcement e↵orts
on the use and outcome of economic sanctions. In accordance with most existing
theories, the model views economic sanctions as a foreign policy to resolve conflict
between the sender and target, but unlike the previous models it also views sanctions
as a domestic policy whose aim is to deter firms from evading sanctions. The central
result from the model is that the government’s capability to enforce sanction policies
is the key to explaining the variations in the impact of sanctions on sender-target
trade, sanctioning government’s decision to impose sanctions as well as outcomes of
sanctions. The model predicts that threats of sanctions are more likely to succeed
when the sender government has the ability to deter firms from evading sanctions.
Concerning the government’s decision to impose sanctions, the model produces some
counter-intuitive predictions. That is, the sender government is more likely to impose
sanctions when enforcement is expected to fail (i.e. firms are expected to evade
sanctions and continue trading). This is because, knowing that imposed sanctions
are to fail, the sender government is only willing to impose sanctions when it knows
its trade relationship with the target will result in no negative economic impacts.
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In Chapters 3 and 4, I test some of the implications from the model against data.
More specifically, in Chapter 3, I test the model’s predictions about the impact of
sanctions on sender-target trade. Using data on bilateral trade and sanctions between
1985-2000, the chapter presents two sets of evidence in support of the theoretical
model. First, when a state with an e↵ective bureaucracy imposes a sanction, it
reduces sender-target trade more rigorously than when a state with an ine↵ective
bureaucracy does the same. Second, when a sender owns a large share of its domestic
firms, a sanction a↵ects the sender-target trade more than when the sender owns
fewer firms. These findings are crucial because they show that firms’ behavior and
their considerations have an important influence on the implementation of sanction
policies.
In Chapter 4, key predictions from the theoretical model are tested. Using the
Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions or TIES data set, I test the relation-
ships between the sender’s ability to enforce sanctions and the various outcomes of
sanctions. The chapter reports three sets of empirical evidence. First, I find that
the threat of sanctions has a higher likelihood of success when the sender is capa-
ble of domestic enforcement. Second, empirical evidence demonstrates that imposed
sanctions are also more successful when the sender is capable of enforcing sanctions.
Third, the chapter provides support for the counter-intuitive claim that the sender
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with the ability to enforce sanctions is less likely to impose sanctions than the one
without it. These results support the key theoretical results that the behavior of
firms and their strategic considerations systematically a↵ect the states’ decisions in
the sanctions episodes.
Chapter 5 builds on the insights and findings from the previous chapters and ex-
amines a question completely overlooked in the literature: Under what conditions do
states choose to pursue multilateral sanctions? Enforcement of multilateral sanctions
often becomes a controversial political issue among members in a coalition. I posit
that whether or not enforcement of multilateral sanctions become e↵ective depends
largely on the primary senders ability to enforce sanctions overseas. Thus, when pri-
mary senders have the ability to enforce sanctions overseas, they are more likely to
pursue multilateral sanctions, but they do so when the expectations of enforcement
of unilateral sanctions are low. I test this implication using the TIES dataset and
find preliminary support.
Finally, Chapter 6 reviews the central arguments and findings of this study and
suggests implications for both scholars and policy makers. The chapter shows how
this project has helped shed light on some of the puzzles in the literature and also
indicate which questions deserve further attention by scholars. For policy mak-
ers, I elucidate how the findings in this project may translate into concrete advice
17
and which issues await further examination. This dissertation highlights the unique
problem the sender government faces in implementing sanctions and shows how gov-
ernments abilities to control their own firms at home as well as firms abroad crucially
determine the outcomes of sanctions.
18
Chapter 2
Theory: Firms, Domestic Enforcement, and
Economic Sanctions
2.1 Introduction
In order to understand how domestic enforcement of sanction policies shapes inter-
national interactions between states, I construct a game-theoretic model of economic
sanctions, which includes firms as a strategic actor along with sender and target
states. By including enforcement as part of sanction episodes, this model combines
two perspectives on economic sanctions. The first perspective views sanctions as an
activity between states through a lens of bargaining theory. The second perspec-
tive treats sanctions as domestic policies to deter firms from trading with the target
state. Combining these two, the model specifies how the behavior of firms a↵ects the
incentives and constraints faced by states in an international strategic environment.
In the following sections, I first describe the role of firms and the enforcement
problems faced by sanctioning governments. Then, I present a game-theoretic model
in which the enforcement problem is included. I solve the game and use the equilib-
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rium results to derive a set of testable empirical hypotheses.
2.2 Firms and Enforcement Problem
To make sanctions work, the sender has to impose severe economic costs on the
target (e.g. Morgan & Schwebach 1997, Drury 1998). Generating costs through
economic sanctions involves more than an announcement of imposing sanctions on
the part of the sender. After deciding to impose sanctions, sender governments
must choose the designs of sanctions. They must decide how extensive sanctions
will be (e.g. comprehensive vs. partial economic embargo), as well as exactly which
groups of individuals, sectors, and goods are to be the primary targets for sanctions.
After choosing the designs of sanctions, the sender government must then implement
sanctions.
After deciding whether to impose sanctions and what types of sanctions to impose,
the sender government typically creates laws that prohibit its domestic firms from en-
gaging in economic transactions with the target state. These sanctions laws threaten
any individual or corporation with civil or criminal prosecution if they are found to
have engaged in economic transactions with the target against the sanctions laws.
For example, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), codified
at 50 U.S.C s. 1701, gives the President the ability to impose economic sanctions
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when he declares (by Executive Order) that there is an “unusual and extraordinary
threat” to the United States. The IEEPA has been used to sanction Iraq, Syria,
Algeria, Libya, Panama, Colombia, among other nations to date. On October 21,
1995, President Clinton used the authority given him by the IEEPA to sign Presi-
dent Directive Decision 42, an Executive Order, invoking economic sanctions against
certain Colombian individuals and companies involved in drug tra cking and money
laundering. PDD 42 makes it illegal for any U.S. company or individual to trade
directly or indirectly with the sanctioned entities. (Richards 1999, 144-145).
To enforce these laws, the sender government delegates its enforcement authority
to its agencies. In the United States, two agencies, the Treasury’s O ce of Foreign
Assets of Control (OFAC) and the Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security
(BIS), are primarily in charge of enforcing sanctions.1 In most other countries,
sanctions are implemented by their central banks, internal enforcement agencies (e.g.
police department), etc. Their primary task is to monitor economic transactions
between domestic entities and sanctioned international entities or states and punish
those who violate these laws by charging them with fines, which in some cases can
be up to one million dollars for a violation case in the United States.
Enforcing sanctions is particularly problematic and di cult for the sender gov-
1 Depending on the scope and type of sanctions, several other agencies like Department of
Homeland Security and Department of Justice assist enforcement e↵orts in the United States.
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ernment. There are several reasons for this. First, profit-maximizing firms who were
in business with the target have a high incentive to continue doing business with the
target. Second, even if some firms stop doing business with the target, this creates
an opportunity for other individuals and firms to take advantage of the arbitrage
rent. Third, in the complex global economy, firms can easily find ways to evade
sanctions by transshipping goods through third countries, concealing the nation of
origin (this is especially easy for commodities like oil and agricultural goods), and
handling transactions through their foreign subsidiaries.
Policy makers often suggest two primary reasons for why these problems in
sanctions enforcement are not adequately addressed: lack of resources and lack of
support from foreign countries. Experts point out that enforcement agencies in
many countries lack resources and technical capacity for sanctions enforcement (e.g.
Mastanduno 1992). Even in the United States, given the number of sanctions pro-
grams, the resources devoted to these enforcement agencies is quite small (GAO
2007).
Lack of foreign support also complicates the agencies’ task. One OFAC o cial
laments that some countries “undermine the embargo [against Cuba] ... by refusing
to ... allow their citizens to provide evidence or testify in embargo-related cases.
These countries have not cooperated in e↵orts to block the export of U.S.-made
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items to Cuba. U.S. o cials reported that this lack of cooperation complicates
agencies’ embargo monitoring and investigatory work” (GAO 2007, 54). Lack of
support from foreign governments is understandably prevalent because such support
can hurt their own firms and reduce their economic activities. For example, the lack
of foreign support was so problematic that the U.S. threatened to impose a secondary
sanction on the U.A.E. for transshipping goods to Iran.2
Agencies can sometimes lessen these problems through cooperation with other
domestic agencies such as the Department of Justice in the United States, which
has significantly more resources and human assets. For illustrative purposes, con-
sider the case of Aviation Services International (ASI), which was charged by OFAC
for violating the Iranian Transactions Regulations. According to o cial documents
published by OFAC, ASI exported U.S. origin aircraft parts, communication equip-
ment, and polymide film from the U.S. to Iran, via the Netherlands without licenses
from OFAC.3 What is striking about this case is that not only did OFAC and BIS
get involved, but so did other agencies such as the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). In fact, ASI previously pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court
of the District of Columbia to one case filed against them by the DOJ for violating
2 “UAE Surprised at U.S. Warning on Syria, Iran Trade,” Reuters, 15 December 2006,
http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/world/20061215-0731-uae-usa-warning.html.
3 Information was taken from documents produced by OFAC’s website (http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/asi_agreement.pdf).
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other regulations. When OFAC received the case, all the relevant information was
available to them because of the previous case brought by the DOJ (DOJ 2009). Ac-
cording to a pre-penalty notice to ASI issued by OFAC, “Information was provided
to OFAC by the DOJ and is described both in the Criminal Complaint filed by the
DOJ against ASI et al. on August 29, 2007 and in the Criminal information filed by
the DOJ against Robert Kiaaipoel, an o cer of ASI” (1). This demonstrates that
cooperation among agencies can occur and is quite helpful in addressing the enforce-
ment problems. However, this sort of cooperation only seems to happen when other
agencies investigate certain firms for violations of non-sanction related regulations
and find information about sanctions violations. Other agencies have their own pri-
orities, and they do not usually cooperate with sanction enforcement agencies on a
regular basis.
Given the lack of enforcement capacity by government agencies, domestic firms
often do not see a high risk in evading sanctions even in the United States. In
fact, one document reports a widespread belief in the U.S. business community that
OFAC does not enforce sanctions and that making e↵orts to abide by sanctions laws
is wasteful and harmful to business.
The Commission heard in informal meetings with representative of
more than one industry that, outside of the financial community, compli-
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ance is voluntary because OFAC undertakes little, if any, investigation or
policing. Counselors for certain businesses claimed that they have trouble
justifying resources for compliance programs when competitors or other
industries often freely ignore sanctions laws. Consequently, it is the re-
sponsible entities that self-police and voluntarily report violations which
become subject to OFAC monitoring and enforcement (Judicial Review
Commission 2001, 119).
Given firms’ belief about the lack of law enforcement and high rewards for evading
sanctions, it is not surprising that they often continue business with sanctioned
targets. This enforcement problem is likely to be more severe in countries where
agency o cials are less professional or have less training and where resources for
enforcement are limited. Without e↵ective enforcement of sanctions, the sender
government will not be able to impose serious economic costs on the target.
These insights about enforcement of sanctions cast doubts on the way scholars
have studied economic sanctions. Traditionally, scholars implicitly assumed that
impositions of sanctions led to a disruption of sender-target economic relationship.
The discussion above suggests that sanctions do not always generate economic harm
on the target and the extent to which they succeed in doing so depends on the actions
taken by firms. Below, I present a game-theoretic model, which incorporates these
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insights.
2.3 Model
Suppose that there are three players: a sender government (S), a target government
(T ), and a representative firm (A).4,5 I assume that the firm operates from within
the sender’s territory and trades with the target. Suppose that there is a political
dispute between the sender and the target over some policy. The sender government
decides whether to threaten the target with economic sanctions in order to coerce
changes in the target’s policy behavior. If the sender decides in favor of threatening
sanctions, the target then decides whether to give in to the sender’s sanctions pressure
by shifting her policy. If the target does not give in, then the sender has another
choice of whether to actually impose the sanctions. The economic sanctions have to
be carried out by the firm. In the event that sanctions are imposed, the firm decides
either to comply with its government’s demand to cut trade or to continue its trade
with the target.
Both the sender and target government care about the disputed policy and the
trade relationship between them. If S successfully coerces a change in T ’s policy,
4 There is typically more than one firm that engages in trade between two countries. However, for
simplicity, the model assumes that these firms are the same and focuses on one representative
firm.
5 I refer to the sender as “he,” the target as “she,” and the firm as “it.”
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S receives a payo↵ of 1, otherwise the payo↵ is 0. Similarly, T receives a payo↵ of
1 if she can maintain her status quo policy, and a payo↵ of 0 otherwise. S and T
both receive a payo↵ of 0 if they can maintain their trade relationship; but, if it
is disrupted, they each receive a payo↵ of   where  > 0. In contrast, the firm
primarily cares about its profit from trading with T . If A can continue making profit
from trading, it receives ⇡ > 0, and 0 otherwise. I also allow for the possibility that
the firm cares about the disputed policy by assuming that it receives     0 if S
successfully coerces a change in T ’s policy.
Sanctions impositions create a dilemma for the firm. When the sender imposes
sanctions, he makes it illegal for the firm to continue trading with the target and
punishes those who violate such laws. A has a choice between complying with the
laws or violating sanctions at a cost. If A complies with sanctions laws, it loses all
profit from trade with the target and receives a payo↵ of 0. If A does not comply
and continues trading with T , it derives a profit of ⇡, but pays the cost of evading
the sanctions   > 0 and risks a penalty with some probability. The parameter  
represents possible cost associated with concealing trade from their governments,
which should be di↵erent from the penalty. Let p denote the probability that the
government finds the firm in violation. Furthermore, let us denote by µ⇡ the amount
of the penalty the firm has to pay when it gets caught in violation where 0 < µ  1
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Figure 2.1 : Game Tree
represents the penalty as a proportion of its profit from trade. This game is illustrated
in Figure 2.1. Below, I explain the game in more detail.
The game begins with a move by the sender, who decides whether to accept the
status quo on a disputed issue, or to demand a shift in the target’s policy in his
favor. If he chooses to maintain the status quo (SQ), the game ends and the players
realize the payo↵ triple of ( ↵, 1, ⇡) where 0  ↵ < 1 and ⇡ > 0. The parameter
↵ represents some cost to the sender government for taking no action against the
target’s policy behavior. When the target violates some international rules, the
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sender government often finds it di cult to condemn the behavior without taking
any coercive measure as the public as well as the international community calls for
severe punishment against the target.6 When the sender does not make a demand,
the target gets to keep its status quo policy and receives a payo↵ of 1. The firm
maintains its trade with the target and receives a profit of ⇡. If the sender makes
a demand of policy change, the demand is accompanied by the threat of economic
sanctions. Following the sender’s decision to make a demand, the target can either
accept the demand or reject it. If the target accepts it, the game ends with a threat
success (TSuccess) and the players realize the payo↵ triple of (1, 0, ⇡), as the target’s
policy is shifted in the sender’s favor and the firm’s profit is not a↵ected.
If the target rejects the demand, the sender has the option of either backing down
or imposing sanctions. If the sender decides to back down, the game ends with a
sender’s capitulation (SCap) and leaves the status quo unchanged with the payo↵ of
(  , 1, ⇡) where 0    < 1. The parameter   represents the reputation cost that
the sender government may incur. This reputation cost can be domestic as Tomz
(2007) has shown that citizens dislike inconsistent foreign policies. Also, the cost can
be international in that backing down from a threat can undermine the credibility of
6 For example, when the Korean aircraft was shot down by the Soviet Union in 1983, U.S.
President Reagan quickly condemned the shooting, but was at first hesitant to threaten or
impose sanctions. Before long, Reagan felt considerable pressure from Congress and the media
and ended up imposing sanctions against the Soviets as a result (Miyagawa 1992).
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future threats (Baldwin 1985, Peterson N.d.).7 I assume that   can be greater than
or less than ↵.
If the sender chooses to carry out his threat and actually impose sanctions, the
firm decides whether to comply with the sanctions and stop trading with the target
or violate sanctions and continue trading. If the firm does not comply with the
sanctions and trades with the target, I assume that the game ends with a sanctions
failure (SFailure|Continue) and the players realize the payo↵ triple of (0, 1, p( µ⇡)+
(1   p)⇡    ) where 0  p  1, µ 2 (0, 1], and     0.8 The parameter p represents
the probability of the firm getting caught in violation and being forced to pay µ⇡.
The term   is the cost of evading sanctions, such as bribing public o cials or extra
costs to transship goods through di↵erent ports. The sender’s payo↵ is 0 because
the target’s policy is unchanged and firms from the sender continue to trade. The
target keeps her status quo policy and continues enjoying trade with the firm; thus,
her payo↵ is 1.
If the firm complies with the sanctions and discontinues trading with the target,
the target has the option of standing firm against the sanctions or acquiescing. If
the target stands firm, the game ends with a sanctions failure (SFailure| ⇠Continue)
7 A recent study by Peterson (2012) provides empirical evidence suggesting that the target of
a sanction threat is less likely to acquiesce to the demand when the United States recently
backed down from a threat.
8 Here, T ’s choice of whether to stand firm or acquiesce is omitted because standing firm is
strictly dominant over acquiescing if the firm continues trading.
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and the players realize the payo↵ triple of ( , 1  , 0). Because the sanctions fail
to coerce a change in T ’s policy, the sender receives 0 for the policy outcome while
the target receives 1. However, both the sender and target su↵er from a loss in trade
( ). As the firm discontinues trading with the target, it loses profit and receives a
payo↵ of 0. If the firm stops trading with the target and the target acquiesces, the
game ends with a sanctions success (SSuccess| ⇠Continue) and leaves the players
with the payo↵ triple of (1    ,  , (1    )⇡ +  ) where   2 (0, 1) and     0.9
The parameter   represents some small portion of the trade that is lost due to the
partial imposition of sanctions. The firm receives a payo↵ of (1    )⇡ +   because
the firm loses some portion of its profit while the sanctions are imposed, but is able
to resume trade with the target once sanctions are lifted.
In this model, we assume that the firm knows all aspects of the game, but the
sender and the target are uncertain about the firm’s cost of evasion,  . Specifically, S
and T have a common belief distribution f(·) over some space [ ,  ¯] with a cumulative
distribution function, F (·). This assumption is reasonable given the illegal nature of
the firm’s operations and the di culty in obtaining information regarding the cost
of such illicit activities.
9 I could write the firm’s utility function as  ˜(1   ) + (1   ˜) where  ˜ is the weight the firm
attaches to its profit and (1   ˜) is the weight attached to the outcome on disputed policy. My
formulation is equivalent to this with   = 1  ˜ ˜ , provided that  ˜ > 0.
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Since the model is a game of incomplete information, I solve the game for its
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). The equilibrium results are summarized in a
proposition in Appendix. Three main implications are derived from the proposition
and presented in the next section.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, I present the equilibrium results. Though the model produces a
number of implications, I focus on three main results derived from the model. The
basic insight in all three results is that firms’ behavior crucially a↵ects the sender’s
and target’s decisions at each stage of the game and thus influences the sanctions
outcomes.
First, I analyze the behavior of the target if sanctions are imposed. The target will
stand firm if the firm does not comply with the sanctions laws and continues trading
with her. However, if the firm complies with the sanctions, the target’s behavior
depends on how valuable the trading relationship with the sender is compared to
the disputed policy. When the firm stops trading under the sanctions, the target
will acquiesce if 1        , 11     and stand firm if 11   < . This suggests
that if the target does not value the trade relationship with the sender, the target
stands firm no matter what the firm does. That is, sanctions never succeed. I call
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this case the “Low Trade Dependence Case.” On the other hand, when the target
values the trading relationship, the target acquiesces if the firm actually complies
with the sanctions laws and stops trading. I call this second case the “High Trade
Dependence Case.”
What is not clear here is whether the sender would ever impose sanctions when
he is pessimistic about the firm’s compliance or when he knows that the target would
stand firm regardless of the firm’s decision. If the sender never imposes sanctions
unless he is optimistic that the firm will comply, then most of the observed instances
of sanctions should succeed, which is inconsistent with most of the views and empir-
ical results present in the literature. In fact, the model suggests that the sender will
impose sanctions that he knows are likely to fail, and he will sometimes do so even
if the sender knows for sure they will fail. To see this, consider the sender’s decision
to impose sanctions in the “High Trade Dependence Case.”
In the “High Trade Dependence Case,” where the target conditions her decision
on the firm’s reaction to sanctions, it turns out that the sender always chooses to
impose sanctions. The logic of this result is the following. If the sender government
is optimistic that his firm will comply with the sanctions laws, then he imposes
sanctions because the target is likely to change her policy. In cases where the sender
government believes that his firm will evade sanctions, the sender is still willing to
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impose sanctions because he is likely to su↵er no loss in trade with the target and
he can avoid incurring the reputation cost of backing down.
Now that we know the sender imposes sanctions in the “High Trade Dependence
Case,” we will consider when the target will reject the sender’s demand. The target’s
decision here depends on her beliefs about the probability that the firm will violate
sanctions. If she is optimistic that the firm will evade the sanctions and continue
trading with the target, she will reject the sender’s demand. If she is pessimistic
that trade will continue, she will accept the demand. Regardless of the target’s
decision to accept or reject the demand, the sender will threaten to impose sanctions
for the same reason he imposes sanctions regardless of the target’s decisions. If the
target will accept the demand, the sender makes the demand because the threat
will successfully lead to a change in the target’s policy. If the target will reject the
demand, the sender still makes the demand because he will su↵er no loss in trade
and avoid incurring the reputation cost of backing down. This discussion leads to
Result 1:
Result 1: Given that the sender makes a demand, a threat of sanctions is more
likely to succeed if the trading relationship is su ciently valuable to the target
and the target is pessimistic that the firm will violate sanctions and continue
trading with her.
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It is worth pointing out the novelty of this result. It suggests that trade de-
pendence is not su cient for threats to succeed. Traditionally, scholars have often
focused on trade linkages or trade dependence and identified it as the key factor in
predicting the sanctions e↵ectiveness (e.g. van Bergeijk 1994, Bonetti 1998). The
model here suggests that such trade linkages or dependence is necessary but not
su cient for the target to acquiesce because the firm may or may not actually cut
trade with the target. Thus, in addition to trade dependence, the target’s belief
about firm’s compliance with sanctions is also necessary for the target to give in to
the demand by the sender.
Next, we shall discuss what the players do in the “Low Trade Dependence Case.”
We already know that the target stands firm regardless of the firm’s action either
because the value of economic exchange with S () is too small compared to the
value of the policy or because   is too large (no incentive to acquiesce). In this
case, the sender’s decision to carry out his threat is more involved than what we
saw in the “High Trade Dependence Case.” Here, impositions of sanctions would
not make sense if the sender only cared about the policy outcome because such a
decision would bring no policy benefit and also because he would lose trade with
the target. However, if the leader expects to su↵er reputation costs for not carrying
out his threats, then the imposition of the sanctions can be a rational choice under
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certain conditions. The sender’s decision is based on the comparison between the
expected loss in trade from imposing sanctions and the reputation cost of backing
down. Thus, given the reputation cost, the sender is more likely to impose sanctions
when he believes that his firm is likely to evade sanction policies. This is because the
sender can protect his reputation without losing trade if the firm ignores sanction
policies. This leads to a counterintuitive result:
Result 2: Given that threats fail, the sender is more likely to impose sanctions if
the reputation cost of backing down is su ciently high and he believes that
the firm will violate the sanctions and continue trading with the target.
Now, consider the conditions under which imposed sanctions are likely to succeed.
The model suggests that imposed sanctions can be successful only when the firm
decides to stop trading with the target. However, this is the case only when the
target values the economic relationship with the sender (“High Trade Dependence
Case”). When the target does not (“Low Trade Dependence Case”), the model
suggests that imposed sanctions can never succeed because the value of the sender-
target trade is so low that the target would rather lose trade with the sender than
shift her current position on the disputed policy. This leads to the third result of the
model:
Result 3: Given that they are imposed, sanctions are more likely to succeed if the
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firm complies with the sanctions.
2.5 Empirical Implications
In deriving empirical implications from the model, I first analyze the firm’s decision,
which will serve as a basis for derivations of additional hypotheses. I begin the dis-
cussion by the firm’s decision in the “High Trade Dependence Case” where the trade
relationship between the sender and the target is valuable to the target. In this case,
the firm knows that the target would stand firm if it continued trading and that the
target would acquiesce if it discontinued trading, it compares its payo↵s associated
with SFailure|Continue and SSuccess| ⇠Continue. That is, the firm continues illicitly
trading with the target if p( µ⇡)+(1 p)⇡  +    (1  )⇡ ,    ⇡(  p(1+µ))+ 
and discontinues trading if   > ⇡(    p(1 + µ)) +  . Intuitively, the firm is more
likely to continue trading with the target as (1) the probability of getting caught
decreases, (2) the penalty for getting caught becomes less severe, (3) the profit from
trading with the target increases, (4) the cost of evading sanctions decreases, and
(5) the firm cares less about the policy outcome.
Similarly, in the “Low Trade Dependence Case,” the firm knows that the target
will not yield to sanctions regardless of its decision, so the firm compares its payo↵s
associated with the following two outcomes: SFailure|Continue and SFailure| ⇠Continue.
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The firm will continue illicitly trading with the target if p( µ⇡)+(1 p)⇡     0,
   ⇡(1   p(1 + µ)). This suggests that the firm is more likely to continue trading
with the target as (1) the probability of getting caught decreases, (2) the penalty
becomes less severe, (3) the profit from trading with the target increases, and (4)
the cost of evading sanctions decreases.
Because most trade is conducted by firms, their decisions directly a↵ect how
sanctions impact trade. That is, all the factors that a↵ect firms’ decisions in the
sanction context should a↵ect how much impact sanctions have on the sender-target
trade relationship. For example, if the penalty is severe, the sanction should have a
large depressing e↵ect on the sender-target trade relationship because firms are much
less likely to evade the sanction policy. Thus, based on these theoretical results, the
following hypotheses are drawn:
Hypothesis 2.1.1 A sanction has a negative impact on the sender-target trade.
Hypothesis 2.1.2 This e↵ect increases as the probability of the firms getting caught
conducting illicit trade rises.
Hypothesis 2.1.3 This e↵ect increases as the penalty for violating the sanction
rises.
Hypothesis 2.1.4 This e↵ect is larger as the amount of profit from doing business
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with the target decreases.
Hypothesis 2.1.5 This e↵ect increases as evading the sanction gets costlier.
Hypothesis 2.1.6 This e↵ect is larger as the firms care more about the disputed
policy.
From Result 1, we know that threats of sanctions can be successful only when
the trade relationship between the sender and the target is valuable to the target
(“High Trade Dependence Case”). Moreover, the target accepts the demand at the
threat stage when she is pessimistic that the firm will continue trading with her.
This suggests that what is important for the likelihood of threat success are factors
that a↵ect the target’s belief about firms’ compliance with sanction policies. In the
model, I assume that the sender and target know the components of the firm’s utility
function except for the cost of evading sanctions. Thus, their belief about the firm’s
compliance with the sanctions is a function of the variables that define the firm’s
utility.
More formally, we can define  ⇤ as a threshold value of   such that  ⇤ = ⇡(   
p(1+µ))+ . If the cost of evasion is lower than this threshold value  ⇤, A will continue
trading with T ; however, if the cost is higher than  ⇤, A will discontinue trading.
Since the sender and target do not know exactly what   is, their beliefs about the
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probability that the firm will evade sanctions can be represented by F ( ⇤) = Pr(  
 ⇤).
While there are several factors (⇡, , p, µ,  ) that influence the target’s beliefs
F ( ⇤), I focus on two factors that will serve as a basis for the empirical analysis in
the following chapters: the probability that the firm gets caught for its illicit trading
with the target, p, and the extent to which the firm cares about the policy outcome,
 . First, as the probability that the firm gets caught for illicit trading increases, the
firm is less likely to continue trading with the target due to the fear of punishment.
In turn, an increase in this probability lowers the target’s belief that the firm will
continue trading with her. When the target believes that the firm is unlikely to
continue trading with her, she accepts the demand before sanctions are imposed to
avoid the likely loss of trade with the sender. Second, similarly to the case with p,
as the firm cares more about the outcome on the disputed policy, the firm is more
likely to discontinue trade with the target, which increases the likelihood that the
target will accept the demand. This discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.2.1 Threats of sanctions are more likely to succeed as the probability
that firms get caught for illicit trading increases.
Hypothesis 2.2.2 Threats of sanctions are more likely to succeed as firms care more
about the policy outcomes.
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Hypothesis 2.2.3 Threats of sanctions are more likely to succeed as the target val-
ues trade with the sender more.
Next, consider the conditions under which the sender imposes sanctions. From
Result 2, we know that the sender backs o↵ from his threat in cases in which the target
does not su ciently value the economic relationship with the sender (“Low Trade
Dependence Case”). In addition, the sender is more likely to impose sanctions when
he expects his firms’ non-compliance. Again, what is crucial for the sender’s decision
to impose sanctions is his belief about the firm’s response to imposed sanctions. In
the “Low Trade Dependence Case,” the firm will continue illicitly trading with the
target if p( µ⇡)+(1 p)⇡     0,    ⇡(1 p(1+µ)). Let us define  ⇤⇤ as another
threshold value of   such that  ⇤⇤ = ⇡(1   p(1 + µ). Then, the sender and target’s
beliefs about firms’ non-compliance can be expressed by F ( ⇤⇤) = Pr(    ⇤⇤).
Here, I focus on one observable factor that influences the sender’s belief about
the firm’s compliance behavior: the likelihood that the firm gets caught for illicit
trading, p. As the probability that the firm gets caught for illicit trading decreases,
the sender’s belief that they will violate sanctions becomes stronger. Thus, the
sender is more likely to impose sanctions as the likelihood that the firm gets caught
decreases.
Furthermore, Result 2 suggests that (expected) reputation cost for the sender
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is an important factor in determining his decision. The sender government faces
reputation costs for backing down, suggesting that higher reputation costs should
increase the chances that the sender will impose sanctions. In addition, when the
sender government expects to incur the reputation cost of backing down, he faces
a di cult choice of whether or not to impose the sanction. This is when he takes
into account the firms’ behavior, suggesting that the e↵ects of the probability of
firms getting caught for illicit trade should be conditional on whether the sender
anticipates paying reputation costs for backing down. This leads to the following
four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2.3.1 Sanctions are more likely to be imposed as the probability that
firms get caught for illicit trading decreases.
Hypothesis 2.3.2 These e↵ects should increase when the sender government’s rep-
utational cost from backing down becomes more severe.
Hypothesis 2.3.3 Sanctions are more likely to be imposed when the sender govern-
ment’s reputational cost from backing down becomes more severe.
Hypothesis 2.3.4 Sanctions are more likely to be imposed as the target values trade
with the sender less.
Now, consider the conditions under which imposed sanctions are likely to succeed.
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From the discussion of Result 3, we know that imposed sanctions can be successful
only in the “High Trade Dependence Case.” Thus, to determine the relationship
between some observable variables and the success of imposed sanctions, I will focus
on firms’ behavior in the “High Trade Dependence Case.” In this case, the firm
chooses to continue illicitly trading with the target if    ⇡(    p(1 + µ)) +   and
discontinues if   > ⇡(   p(1+µ))+  . I again focus on two variables that influence
the firm’s payo↵: the probability that the firm gets caught for illicit trading with the
target, p, and how much the firm cares about the policy outcome,  . First, as the
probability that the firm gets caught for trading with the target increases, the firm
is less likely to engage in illicit trading with the target. Thus, imposed sanctions are
more likely to succeed as the likelihood that the firm gets caught for illicit trading
increases. Second, as the firm cares more about the policy outcome, it is less likely
to engage in illicit trading with the target. Thus, imposed sanctions are more likely
to succeed as the firm cares more about the policy outcome.
We should note here that these relationships between these factors and the success
of imposed sanctions should not be as strong as the ones between these factors and
threat success. The reason for this is that most cases where the firm is likely to
comply with sanctions policies (p is high or   is high) end with threat success,
which may leave too little empirical variation in p and   to reveal clear systematic
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relationships between these factors and the success of imposed sanctions.
Hypothesis 2.4.1 Imposed sanctions are more likely to succeed as the probability
that firms get caught for illicit trading decreases.
Hypothesis 2.4.2 Imposed sanctions are more likely to succeed as firms’ cost of
evading sanctions decreases.
Hypothesis 2.4.3 Imposed sanctions are more likely to succeed as the target values
trade with the sender more.
2.6 Conclusion
In contrast to the traditional perspective on economic sanctions, the main argument
advanced in this chapter has been that states do not make decisions in sanctions
context independently of how sanctions a↵ect their firms and what these firms do in
response. Rather, states anticipate firms’ compliance behavior and incorporate it in
their considerations, sometimes in a surprising manner. More specifically, this chap-
ter presented the solution and empirical implications of a formal model of economic
sanctions through which the behavior of firms influences the sender’s and target’s
decisions during sanctions processes. The model o↵ers at least two important in-
sights into the study of economic sanctions. First, the e↵ectiveness of a sanction
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threat depends crucially on the anticipated behavior of firms—whether they comply
with or evade the sanction. When governments are capable of e↵ectively enforcing
sanctions, their sanctions threats are more credible. Second, and surprisingly, the
sender government is more likely to impose sanctions when he anticipates his firms’
non-compliance with sanction policies. The conclusion is that a government with the
capability to enforce sanctions not only is e↵ective in using sanctions, but also is the
one who is least likely to actually impose sanctions. Based on these insights, I de-
rived several sets of testable hypotheses regarding the e↵ects of sanctions on trade,
the e↵ectiveness of threats and imposed sanctions, and governments’ decisions to
impose sanctions.
The theoretical model also o↵ers an implication for the existing perspective that
argues that sanctions mostly serve symbolic purposes (e.g. Lindsay 1986, Whang
2011). Assuming that sanctions are costless to the sender states, scholars have ar-
gued that sanctions are often used symbolically to express morality and/or to raise
domestic public support for policymakers. Unlike prior studies, the findings in this
study identify the conditions under which senders use sanctions as a symbolic tool.
That is, governments with the enforcement capability are less likely to use sanctions
for symbolic reasons because impositions of sanctions would be costly for them. This
also means that governments that cannot e↵ectively enforce sanctions are the ones
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who sanction symbolically because there are no economic consequences for doing so.
I conclude this chapter by pointing out some fruitful extensions of the model for
future research. First, the current model assumes for the sake of simplicity that the
sender is as uncertain about the firm’s compliance behavior as the target. However, it
may be more reasonable to assume that the sender knows more about his own firms
than the target. This alternative assumption will not change the central results
presented in this chapter. However, it would generate additional insights about the
working of economic sanctions.
Second, another assumption in the model has to do with the treatment of firms.
The current model assumes one representative firm and focuses on the question of
how this firm a↵ect states’ decisions and vice-versa. However, as mentioned earlier,
firms may take other firms into account when they make their compliance decisions
and these decisions are likely to be strategic. Furthermore, firms may face di↵erent
incentives and constraints depending on their characteristics. In fact, recent research
in international trade demonstrates that exporting and importing firms are quite
heterogeneous in their sizes and productivity (e.g. Bernard, Jensen, Redding & Schott
2007). Examining the firms’ decisions when there are multiple, heterogeneous firms
would lead to a number of interesting questions.
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2.7 Appendix
Solution
I solve the game for its perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), which requires that the
players’ strategies, given their beliefs, are best responses to other players’ strategies
and beliefs. It is convenient to divide the solution in two parts: when 11     and
when 11   > . I call the first case the “High Trade Dependence Case” as the target
values her trade with the sender compared to the disputed issue. In this case, the
target’s decision to stand firm depends on the firm’s reaction to sanctions. If the
firm continues trading with the target, the target will stand firm; but, if the firms
choose to discontinue trading, she will acquiesce. To see this, consider T ’s decision
when A discontinues trading with T . If A discontinues trading, T will stand firm if
1   >   , 11   >  and acquiesce if 11    .
In the latter case, which I call the “Low Trade Dependence Case,” the target’s
decision to stand firm does not depend on the firms’ decision – the target will stand
firm regardless of the firm’s decision. This is because the target does not value her
trading relationship with the sender and/or because the value of the disputed issue
is high for the target. First, consider the “High Trade Dependence” case.
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High Trade Dependence Case ( 11    ): Consider A’s decision to continue
trading with T . Because A knows that T will stand firm if it continues trading and
that T will acquiesce if it discontinues trading, A compares the payo↵s associated
with SFailure|Continue and SSuccess| ⇠Continue. That is, A continues trading if
p( µ⇡) + (1  p)⇡    +     (1   )⇡ ,    ⇡(   p(1 + µ)) +   and discontinues
trading if   > ⇡(    p(1 + µ)) +  . Intuitively, the firm is more likely to continue
trading with the target as (1) the probability of the firm getting caught decreases,
(2) the penalty becomes less severe, (3) the profit from trading increases, and (4)
the cost of evading sanctions decreases. Let us define  ⇤ as a cuto↵ value of   such
that  ⇤ = ⇡(    p(1 + µ)) +  . If the cost of evasion is lower than this cuto↵
value  ⇤, A will continue trading with T ; however, if the cost is higher than  ⇤, A
will discontinue trading. Since the sender and the target do not know exactly what
  is, their beliefs about the probability that the firm will evade sanctions can be
represented by F ( ⇤) = Pr(    ⇤).
Now, consider S’s decision to impose economic sanctions. S will impose sanctions
if F ( ⇤)(0) + (1   F ( ⇤))(1    )      , F ( ⇤)  1  + 1   . This condition always
holds because 1  + 1     1. This means that the sender chooses to impose sanctions
no matter what the firm decides to do.
Next, consider T ’s decision to reject S’s demand. T will reject the demand if she
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is optimistic that A will continue trading with her. That is, T will reject the demand
if F ( ⇤)(1) + (1  F ( ⇤))(  )   0, F ( ⇤)    1+  . Regardless of T ’s decision to
reject the demand, S will threatens to impose sanctions.
Thus, in the “High Trade Dependence” case, the game ends with a threat success,
a sanctions success, or a sanctions failure. A threat is more likely to be successful
when the target is pessimistic that the firm will continue trading. If the sender and
target both believe that the firm will evade sanctions, a threat will fail and sanctions
will be imposed. The success of sanctions depends on whether or not the firm evade
sanctions.
Low Trade Dependence Case ( 11   > ): In this case, T will stand firm re-
gardless of A’s action either because the value of the trading relationship with S
() is low compared to the value of the policy or because   is large (no incentive
to acquiesce). Again, consider A’s decision to continue trading with T . Since the
target will not yield to sanctions regardless of the firm’s decision, the firm will com-
pare the payo↵s associated with the following two outcomes: SFailure|Continue and
SFailure| ⇠Continue. A will continue trading if p( µ⇡) + (1   p)⇡       0 ,
   ⇡(1   p(1 + µ)). Let us define  ⇤⇤ as another cuto↵ value of   such that
 ⇤⇤ = ⇡(1   p(1 + µ)). Then, the sender and the target’s beliefs that A will evade
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sanctions can be expressed by F ( ⇤⇤) = Pr(    ⇤⇤).
Consider S’s decision to carry out his threat and impose sanctions. S will impose
sanctions if F ( ⇤⇤)(0)+(1 F ( ⇤⇤))( )      , F ( ⇤⇤)      and will not impose
them if F ( ⇤⇤) <    .
Now, consider T ’s decision to reject S’s demand. If F ( ⇤⇤) <    (S backs
down), T will reject the demand because she knows her rejection will lead to the
sender’s capitulation. If F ( ⇤⇤)      (S imposes the sanctions), T will also reject
the demand. To see this, recall that the sender will impose sanctions when he believes
that the firm will evade sanctions. In this case, because the target is also optimistic
that the firm will evade sanctions, she will reject the demand. More formally, we can
compare the target’s payo↵ associated with TSuccess and her expected utility from
rejecting S’s demand. That is, T rejects the demand if F ( ⇤⇤)(1)+ (1 F ( ⇤⇤))(1 
)   0, F ( ⇤⇤)    1 . This condition always holds because   < 1 and  1     .
Finally, consider S’s decision to make a demand. Suppose F ( ⇤⇤)      . In
this case, S knows that making a demand will lead to T ’s rejection of the demand
and ultimately to the failure of imposed sanctions. On the other hand, if the sender
maintains the status quo, he will incur the domestic punishment for taking no action.
Thus, if the cost of doing nothing is high or ↵    , the sender will make a demand.
In contrast, if the cost of taking no action is low or ↵ <  , the sender will retain
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the status quo. Next, whenF ( ⇤⇤) <    , S knows that if he makes a demand, the
target will reject it and he will back down from the threat. On the other hand, if
he maintains the status quo, he will su↵er the domestic punishment from taking no
action. Thus, if the reputation cost is low compared to the cost of taking no action
or ↵    , the sender will choose to make a threat and backs down later. If the
reputation cost is high or ↵ <  , the sender will retain the status quo.
Thus, in the “Low Trade Dependence” case, the game ends with either the status
quo, the sender’s capitulation, or a sanctions failure. Notice that there is no success
of a threat or imposed sanctions in this case.
Proposition 1: Define  ⇤ = ⇡(    p(1 + µ)) +   and  ⇤⇤ = ⇡(1   p(1 + µ)). The
unique PBE of the game consists of the following strategies and beliefs:
1. If 11     and F ( ⇤)    1+  , S makes a demand; T rejects the demand; S
imposes sanctions; A continue trading with T if     ⇤ and discontinue if
  >  ⇤; T stands firm if A continues, and acquiesces if A discontinues.
2. If 11     and F ( ⇤) <  1+  , S makes a demand; T accepts the demand;
S imposes sanctions; A continue trading with T if     ⇤ and discontinue if
  >  ⇤; T stands firm if A continues, and acquiesces if A discontinues.
3. If 11   >  and F ( 
⇤⇤)      and    ↵, S makes a demand; T rejects
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the demand; S imposes sanctions; A continue trading with T if     ⇤⇤ and
discontinue if   >  ⇤⇤; T stands firm.
4. If 11   >  and F ( 
⇤⇤)      and   > ↵, S retains the status quo; T rejects
the demand; S imposes sanctions; A continue trading with T if     ⇤⇤ and
discontinue if   >  ⇤⇤; T stands firm.
5. If 11   >  and F ( 
⇤⇤) <    and    ↵, S makes a demand; T rejects the
demand; S does not impose sanctions; A continue trading with T if     ⇤⇤
and discontinue if   >  ⇤⇤; T stands firm.
6. If 11   >  and F ( 
⇤⇤) <    and   > ↵, S retains the status quo; T rejects
the demand; S does not impose sanctions; A continue trading with T if     ⇤⇤
and discontinue if   >  ⇤⇤; T stands firm.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Analysis I:
Firms, Domestic Enforcement, and
Impact of Sanctions on Trade
3.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates some of the model’s implications regarding the impact of
sanctions on sender-target trade relationships. More specifically, it empirically tests
Hypotheses 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.1.6 which were derived from the model developed
in Chapter 2. The hypotheses suggest that characteristics of the sender state are
important for how sanctions a↵ect his trade relationship with the target. Therefore,
I introduce two novel measures of the characteristics of sender states. I then report
the results of the analysis and show how some factors identified by the theoretical
model influence the impact of sanctions on sender-target trade relationships. As
these tests address a part of the model which directly links the behavior of firms to
the implementation of imposed sanctions, positive results for them would provide
more confidence in the causal mechanism pictured in the theory.
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3.2 Research Design
Hypotheses 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.1.6 presented in Chapter 2 suggest that impositions
of sanctions lead to reduction in sender-target trade, but the extent of the reduction
depends upon two factors: namely, the probability that firms get caught for illicit
trading and the extent to which sender governments’ and their firms’ preferences
align with each other. To test the hypotheses, I conduct two separate analyses using
di↵erent dependent variables, namely bilateral export and import volumes. While
some studies analyze the impact of sanctions on more aggregate, total trade volume
(Caruso 2003, Hufbauer, Elliott, Cyrus & Winston 1997), di↵erentiating exports
from imports is more appropriate and provides more precise estimates of sanctions’
e↵ects, as they can be specifically targeted at either exports or imports in some cases
(e.g. Yang, Askari, Forrer & Teegen 2004, Hufbauer & Oegg 2003).
In the first set of analyses, the dependent variable is the natural log of export
volume from state i to j (ln(Export)i,j,t) and I analyze the e↵ect of export sanctions
on the sender-target export levels. In the second set, the dependent variable is
the natural log of import volume from state i to j (ln(Import)i,j,t) and the e↵ect
of import sanctions on the import levels is examined. The unit of analysis is the
directed-dyad-year, which conforms with the theoretical expectations about the level
of trade between state i and state j. The data on bilateral trade were obtained from
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Gleditsch (2002) and deflated to 2000 U.S. dollars using the U.S. Consumer Price
Index following Rose (2004).1 As a result of data availability, the data set analyzed
here includes 362,964 observations with 26,818 directed-dyads from 1985 to 2000.
3.2.1 Independent Variables
Sanctions
In order to identify sanctions episodes, I use the Threats and Impositions of Eco-
nomic Sanctions (TIES) data set (Morgan, Bapat & Krustev 2009), which codes
both threats and sanctions and currently covers the 1971-2000 period.2 TIES defines
sanctions as actions that one or more sender states or an international institution
take to limit economic relations with a single target state in an e↵ort to persuade
the latter to change its policies. Economic coercion begins when the sender makes a
threat about the possibility of sanctions - threats are usually initiated through verbal
statements by government o cials or the drafting of legislation against the target.
I use five decision rules to restrict the sample of sanction cases. First, because
my argument addresses the e↵ect of imposed sanctions, rather than threats, I exclude
all the episodes where sanctions were not imposed. Second, I exclude all multilateral
1 The index is available online at the website of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov/
cpi/).
2 The TIES data set can be obtained at http://www.unc.edu/~bapat/TIES.htm.
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sanction cases, defined as a case when there are more than on sender and/or inter-
national institutions are involved. I focus on unilateral sanctions because the model
speaks only to cases with one sender. Third, as the theory considers the e↵ects of
trade sanctions, I exclude non-trade sanctions such as termination of foreign aid,
asset freezes, and travel bans. Fourth, I exclude sanction cases that did not last
longer than three months. Fifth, I also exclude cases in which the target was an
international organization or an entity excluded from the list of the Correlates of
War state memberships (e.g. Macao).
Based on these sanction cases, I constructed two key independent variables:
Exp Sanctioni,j,t and Imp Sanctioni,j,t. The first variable is a dummy variable that
is coded 1 if state i has export restrictions imposed against state j in year t, and 0
otherwise. This variable is used for the analysis of the e↵ect of a sanction on export
volumes.
The second variable is also a dummy variable that is coded 1 if state i restricts
imports from j to i in year t, and 0 otherwise. This variable is used when I analyze
the e↵ect of a sanction on import volumes. We expect that both sanction variables
are negatively related to the bilateral export and import volumes.
Some sanctions are clearly more severe than others. In order to achieve better
comparability in the types of sanctions, I also include a variable, Complete Embargoi,j,t,
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a dummy variable that is coded 1 if state i imposed a complete embargo against state
j in year t, and 0 otherwise. This variable is included in both analyses of export and
import volumes.
Risk of Non-compliance
One key implication from the theory is that the e↵ect of sanctions on the sender-
target trade is conditional on the likelihood of firms getting caught for their il-
licit trading. To proxy for this unobservable probability, I construct a variable,
E↵ Bureaucracyi,t. The idea behind this variable is that the sender with an e↵ective
bureaucracy should be able to monitor the behavior of firms more e ciently and
detect those who violate sanction policies with a higher probability. In turn, firms
operating in a state with an e↵ective bureaucracy should view violations as risker
options and thereby should be less likely to evade sanction policies. Ideally, I would
have a variable that measures the e↵ectiveness (e.g. the professionalism, how cor-
rupted the sanctions enforcement agencies are, how many resources these agencies
have) of bureaucratic agencies that specifically enforce sanctions. Unfortunately,
such data do not exist. Thus, I opted for using an aggregate measure of bureau-
cratic quality from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data set, which
measures e↵ectiveness on a scale from 1 to 4 on the basis of expert assessments (4
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denotes good quality and 1 poor quality) for 140 countries from 1985 to 2007.3 This
bureaucratic quality variable measures strength, professionalism, and e ciency of bu-
reaucracies in each country. This information adequately captures the e↵ectiveness
of sanctions enforcement agencies because many bureaucratic agencies get involved in
sanctions enforcement. Using this data set from ICRG, I construct a binary variable
(E↵ Bureaucracyi,t) that codes 1 if the bureaucratic quality variable takes a value of
4, and 0 otherwise. To test the interactive e↵ect between sanctions and this variable,
I include Exp Sanctioni,j,t⇥E↵ Bureaucracyi,t and Imp Sanctioni,j,t⇥E↵ Bureaucracyi,t
in the analyses.
Preference Alignment between Governments and Firms
Another hypothesis from the theory suggests that the e↵ect of sanctions depends
on the extent to which firms care about social welfare. To proxy for this concept, I
construct a variable that measures the extent to which states own the firms within
their territories, or the extent of state-owned enterprise in the states. The idea here
3 To construct the bureaucratic quality variable, another source for data is the World Bank’s
World Governance Indicators (WGIs) data set (e.g. Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2009).
However, the temporal coverage of WGIs is from 1996 to 2010, making their use in the present
analysis somewhat limited. For the same reason, the ICRG bureaucratic quality has also
been used more widely in a number of studies to proxy for state capacity, and the quality
of governance, and bureaucratic e ciency (e.g. Knack 2001, Smith, Muir, Walpole, Balmford
& Leader-Williams 2003, de Rouen & Sobek 2004). Moreover, in a study by Knack & Rah-
man (2007), this variable has been validated against a more detailed, but limited, dataset on
bureaucratic quality created by Evans & Rauch (1999).
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is that if firms are owned by the state, their preferences would be more aligned
with the government’s foreign policy goals so that we should expect less evasion
of sanctions. In the current analysis, I use data from the Economic Freedom of the
World data set (Gwartney, Lawson & Block 1996, Gwartney, Lawson & Norton 2008)
which records government investment as a share of total investment in 117 countries
between 1980 and 2000. Because the data are skewed, I include the natural log
of the variable and use it (ln(SOE)it). Because the hypotheses specify conditional
relationships, I also include the interaction terms, namely Exp Sanctioni,j,t⇥ln(SOE)i,t
and Imp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ ln(SOE)i,t.
3.2.2 Empirical Models
To estimate the e↵ect of sanctions on bilateral trade, I use the gravity model used ex-
tensively in the trade literature as well as international relations literature to predict
trade levels between a pair of countries (e.g. Bergstrand 1985). The use of this model
is attractive because it is tractable and also based on theoretical micro-foundations
of bilateral trade. I first specify gravity models of bilateral trade used in the analyses.
For the first set of analyses, I specify the gravity model in the following way:
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ln(Export)i,j,t = ↵i,j +  0Exp Sanctioni,j,t +  1Complete Embargoi,j,t+
 2Exp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ E↵ Bureaucracyi,t +  3E↵ Bureaucracyi,t+
 4Exp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ ln(SOE)i,t +  5ln(SOE)i,t+
 7ln(GDP)i,t +  8ln(GDP)j,t +  9ln(Pop)i,t +  10ln(Pop)j,t+
 11Demi,t +  12Demj,t +  13Defensei,j,t + ✏i,j,t
Similarly, for the analyses of import volume, the gravity model is specified as follows:
ln(Import)i,j,t = ↵i,j +  0Imp Sanctioni,j,t +  1Complete Embargoi,j,t+
 2Imp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ E↵ Bureaucracyi,t +  3E↵ Bureaucracyi,t+
 4Imp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ ln(SOE)i,t +  5ln(SOE)i,t+
 7ln(GDP)i,t +  8ln(GDP)j,t +  9ln(Pop)i,t +  10ln(Pop)j,t+
 11Demi,t +  12Demj,t +  13Defensei,j,t + ✏i,j,t
where ln(GDP)i,t is the natural log of the gross domestic product (GDP) of country
i in time period t. This variable is used to proxy the size of the nation’s economy
within the gravity model. Thus, these GDP variables should be positively related to
export and import volumes. The data are obtained from Gleditsch (2002). ln(Pop)i,t
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denotes the natural log of the population of country i in time period t. In the
gravity framework, this variable represents the size of the nation’s market. I expect
this population variable to be positively associated with total trade. The data on
populations are also obtained from Gleditsch (2002). Demi,t is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if country i is a democracy. This variable is coded 1 if
country i scores six or higher on the Polity IV democracy scale (Marshall & Jaggers
2005). These democracy variables are expected to be positively related to total trade.
Defensei,j,t is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a pair of countries has a defense
pact with one another. The data I use to code this variable is from the ATOP
dataset (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell & Long 2002). I expect the defense pact variable to
be positively related to total trade (e.g. Long 2003). To account for heterogeneity
across time, I include year dummy variables. Similarly, I also include directed-dyad
specific variables to account for heterogeneity across trading relationships (e.g. Tomz,
Goldstein & Rivers 2007).4
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Table 3.1 : Analysis of Bilateral Import Level
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Imp Sanctioni,j,t  0.17⇤⇤  0.03 0.30 0.81⇤⇤
(0.03) (0.09) (0.24) (0.32)
Imp Sanctioni,j,t ⇤ E↵ Bureaucracyi,t  0.18⇤  0.28⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.11)
E↵ Bureaucracyi,t 0.01
⇤⇤ 0.02⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.01)
Imp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ ln(SOE)i,t  0.16⇤⇤  0.26⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.11)
ln(SOE)i,t 0.15
⇤⇤  0.03⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.01)
Complete Embargoi,j,t  1.55⇤⇤  1.74⇤⇤  1.75⇤⇤  1.73⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
ln(Population)i,t 0.14
⇤⇤ 0.17⇤⇤  0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
ln(Population)j,t 0.04
⇤ 0.15⇤⇤ 0.04⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(GDP)i,t 0.47
⇤⇤ 0.64⇤⇤ 0.52⇤⇤ 0.58⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(GDP)j,t 0.42
⇤⇤ 0.47⇤⇤ 0.46⇤⇤ 0.49⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Defense Pacti,j,t 0.22⇤⇤ 0.29⇤⇤ 0.22⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Democracyi,t 0.05
⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤ 0.05⇤⇤ 0.11⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracyj,t 0.05
⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant  7.87⇤⇤  10.89⇤⇤  7.04⇤⇤  8.45⇤⇤
(0.23) (0.32) (0.28) (0.36)
Observations 362,964 248,906 254,920 200,531
Note: Coe cients on the year and directed-dyad dummy variables are not
reported due to space consideration. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests ⇤p < .05, ⇤ ⇤ p < .001.
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Table 3.2 : Analysis of Bilateral Export Volume
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Exp Sanctioni,j,t  0.56⇤⇤  0.01  0.50⇤ 0.36
(0.04) (0.22) (0.30) (0.45)
Exp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ E↵ Bureaucracyi,t  0.16⇤⇤  0.38⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.14)
E↵ Bureaucracyi,t 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Exp Sanctioni,j,t ⇥ ln(SOE)i,t  0.03  0.14
(0.10) (0.10)
ln(SOE)i,t 0.01  0.02⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01)
Complete Embargoi,j,t  0.94⇤⇤  1.01⇤⇤  1.05⇤⇤  1.01⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
ln(Population)i,t 0.08
⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤  0.18⇤⇤  0.08⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Population)j,t 0.07
⇤⇤ 0.15⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤ 0.10⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(GDP)i,t 0.42
⇤⇤ 0.57⇤⇤ 0.46⇤⇤ 0.50⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(GDP)j,t 0.47
⇤⇤ 0.53⇤⇤ 0.50⇤⇤ 0.54⇤⇤
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Defense Pacti,j,t 0.21⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤ 0.21⇤⇤ 0.30⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Democracyi,t 0.04
⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤ 0.03⇤⇤ 0.09⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracyj,t 0.05
⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤ 0.07⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant  7.59⇤⇤  10.68  8.20  2.67⇤
(0.23) (0.32) (210.29) (1.24)
Observations 362,964 248,906 254,920 200,531
Note: Coe cients on the year and directed-dyad dummy variables are not
reported due to space consideration. Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests ⇤p < .05, ⇤ ⇤ p < .001.
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3.3 Empirical Results
The empirical results for the analyses of import and export volumes are summarized
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. The specifications presented as Models 1 and
5 include only the sanction variables and all the gravity controls; Models 2 and 6
include E↵ Bureaucracy and its interaction term with the sanction variables; Models
3 and 7 include ln(SOE) and its interaction with the sanction variables; Models 4
and 8 are the full specifications.
First, consider Models 1 and 4. The coe cients of the Imp Sanction and Exp
Sanction are negative as predicted and statistically significant. This suggests that
sanctions depress export and import volumes between the sender and the target.
It is important to note that these empirical findings are novel. Using the data set
produced by Hufbauer et al. (1990), several existing studies have investigated the
impact of sanctions on trade and have reported a large depressing e↵ect of severe
sanctions (e.g. complete embargoes). However, they consistently found the impact
of moderate sanctions to be negligible and unimportant (Caruso 2003, Askari et al.
2003, Hufbauer & Oegg 2003, Hufbauer et al. 2007). Using the new TIES data set,
4 These model specifications do not include a distance variable that is often used in gravity
models. This is because I use directed dyad fixed e↵ects in the models, which estimates
the within-e↵ects of variables, and any e↵ect of time-invariant variable such as geographical
distance cannot be estimated.
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the results here suggest that more moderate sanctions have a large impact on the
sender-target trade relationship after controlling for the e↵ect of complete embargoes.
Next, the results for import volumes will be discussed in more detail. Consider
Model 2 in Table 3.1. The findings for the interaction term between Imp Sanction
and E↵ Bureaucracy supports Hypothesis 1. The coe cient of the interaction is
negative and statistically significant. This suggests that when the sender has an
e↵ective bureaucracy, a sanction has a large negative impact on export from the
sender to the target. In contrast, the lack of e↵ective bureaucracy reduces the im-
pact of sanction. In Model 3, the coe cient of the interaction between Imp Sanction
and ln(SOE) is also negative, as predicted, and statistically significant. This implies
that when more firms in the sender are owned by the government, a sanction has
a larger impact on the import volume from the target to the sender than when the
sender owns fewer firms. In Model 4, the coe cients on the interactions become
even larger and more significant. To interpret these findings in a more substantive
way, I calculated the e↵ects of the sanction variable at di↵erent values of E↵ Bu-
reaucracy and ln(SOE). More specifically, using estimates from Model 4, I simulate
E[Import|Im Sanction=1,E↵ Bureaucracy=X]
E[Import|Imp Sanction=0,E↵ Bureaucracy=X]   1 and E[Import|Imp Sanction=1,ln(SOE)=X]E[Import|Imp Sanction=0,ln(SOE)=X]   1 as I set
the E↵ Bureaucracy and ln(SOE) at di↵erent values, holding all the other variables
at their median.
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Figure 3.1 : Conditional E↵ect of a Sanction on Import Volume: Each panel
presents the 95% confidence band of the e↵ect of a sanction on import volume. The
95% confidence interval at each incremental step is based on 1,000 simulations. All
other variables except for the year dummies are held at their median.
The left panel in Figure 3.1 depicts how the impact of a sanction on export
changes as the sender’s bureaucracy becomes less e↵ective. The depressing e↵ect
of a sanction is substantively large when the sender has an e↵ective bureaucracy:
the mean e↵ect is about 30% reduction in import volume. However, this e↵ect de-
creases and becomes indistinguishable from zero as the sender’s bureaucracy becomes
non-e↵ective. This graph is thus consistent with my hypothesis that an e↵ective bu-
reaucracy amplifies the negative impact of a sanction on trade. The right panel in
Figure 1 is also consistent with my hypothesis. It shows how the impact of a sanction
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changes as the sender owns more firms within the country. When the sender govern-
ment invests about 10% of total investment in the country, the impact of a sanction
is negligible; however, as the amount of government investment increases, the e↵ect
becomes quite large. In sum, the results from my analysis of export volumes support
that sanctions depress sender-target trade but only when the sender has e↵ective
bureaucracy and/or owns firms within the country.
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Figure 3.2 : Conditional E↵ect of a Sanction on Export Volume: Each panel
presents the 95% confidence band of the e↵ect of a sanction on export volume. The
95% confidence interval at each incremental step is based on 1,000 simulations. All
other variables except for the year dummies are held at their median.
I now turn to the models of export volumes in Table 3.2. The results are similar
to what I found with import volumes, but it is worth mentioning one di↵erence.
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While the results for the bureaucratic e↵ectiveness variable is quite similar, the
coe cients on the interactions between ln(SOE) and Exp Sanction are negative but
not statistically significant in Models 7 and 8. However, in Figure 3.2 where I graphed
the substantive e↵ects of a sanction by the di↵erent levels of government investment,
I see that the e↵ect of a sanction becomes distinguishable from zero when the share
of government investment in total investment reaches about 30%. Though the e↵ect
of this variable is not very strong, this result suggests that as the sender owns more
firms within the country, sanctions have more depressing e↵ects on its export from
the target.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tested three implications of the model presented in Chapter
2. More specifically, the empirical analyses have examined the e↵ect of sanctions on
sender-target trade relationships and, more importantly, how the sanctions’ e↵ects on
trade change once firms’ behavior and enforcement were taken into account. When
firms are likely to abide by sanction policies, we should observe more depressing
impacts of sanctions on sender-target trade. Consistent with this expectation, the
findings in this chapter suggest that sanctions reduce sender-target trade when they
are imposed by those with e↵ective bureaucracies and with state-owned enterprises.
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By showing that firms’ considerations do shape the implementation of sanctions in
a systematic manner, these results provide confidence for the theoretical model in
Chapter 2.
While these findings are central for the causal mechanism laid out in Chapter 2,
they do not yet show that decisions by sender and target states are influenced by
the behavior of firms. To evaluate this aspect of the theory, I need to test another
set of hypotheses that link the firms’ calculations to several di↵erent decisions faced
by sender and target states during sanctions episodes. This is the task undertaken
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Analysis II:
Firms, Domestic Enforcement,
and Sanctions E↵ectiveness
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes how domestic enforcement of sanctions and the behavior of
firms a↵ect di↵erent outcomes of sanctions. More specifically, it evaluates the hy-
potheses regarding the success of sanction threats (Hypotheses 2.2.1-2.2.3), the im-
positions of sanctions (Hypotheses 2.3.1-2.3.4), and the success of imposed sanctions
(Hypotheses 2.4.1-2.4.3). To evaluate these hypotheses, I conduct three sets of anal-
yses with di↵erent outcome variables. The findings in this chapter provide strong
support for the argument that the behavior of firms has an important influence on
states’ decisions and sanctions outcomes.
4.2 Research Design
To test the hypotheses, I draw economic sanctions data from the TIES data set.
Because my hypotheses are about outcomes at di↵erent stages in sanctions episodes
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(threat success, sanctions imposition, and success of imposed sanctions), I conduct
three sets of analyses using three separate samples and three di↵erent dependent
variables.
In the first set of analyses, I examine threat successes with all cases where sanc-
tions are threatened. TIES includes 888 sanctions cases, but after excluding (1)
observations with missing values, (2) those that started with the imposition of sanc-
tions without threats and (3) those with multiple senders, I am left with a total of
319 unilateral sanctions cases for the analysis of threat successes.1 The dependent
variable for these analyses specifies whether sanctions are successful at the threat
stage in sanctions episodes. I code a case as a successful threat if TIES reports that
the target capitulated or partially capitulated or the case ended with a negotiated
settlement.
Second, to analyze the sender’s decision to impose sanctions, the sample was
generated by excluding from all the threat cases those in which the target acquiesced
prior to sanctions imposition. A total of 229 cases are used for the analysis of
sanctions imposition. The dependent variable here specifies if the sender imposes
sanctions. Using information on the date of sanctions impositions, I code a case as
1 I also exclude cases in which the target is an international organization or an entity that the
Correlates of War project does not recognize as a state (e.g. Macao or Hong-Kong). Due to
limits in the availability of bureaucratic quality measure, the temporal domain of my data is
limited to 1985-2000.
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an imposition case if TIES codes a non-missing value for the sanctions imposition
date.
Finally, I analyze the target’s decision to acquiesce after sanctions are imposed.
I exclude from threat cases those in which the target acquiesced prior to sanctions
imposition and those in which the sender did not impose sanctions. For this analysis,
a total of 119 cases are analyzed. For this set of analyses, the dependent variable
indicates whether or not the target complies with the sender’s demands after sanc-
tions are imposed. I code a case as a successful (imposed) sanction if TIES reports
that the target capitulated or partially capitulated or that the case ended with a ne-
gotiated settlement. Probit models are used to analyze how these outcome variables
are related to a set of independent variables, which I will discuss next.
4.2.1 Independent Variables
To test the hypotheses, five independent variables are constructed. The first two
variables are prepared to test Hypotheses 2.1.1, 2.2.1, and 2.3.1 and proxy for the
probability that the firm gets caught for illicit trading. The third variable captures
the extent to which firms care about policy outcomes for the tests of Hypotheses
2.1.2 and 2.3.2. The fourth variable measures senders’ reputation costs and will be
used to evaluate Hypotheses 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. Finally, the fifth variable captures the
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extent to which targets value the trading relationships with senders and will be used
to test Hypotheses 2.1.3, 2.2.4, and 2.3.3.
Risk of Non-compliance
The first independent variable is E↵ective Bureaucracy, which was discussed and
used in Chapter 3. The logic behind this is as follows: because sanction policies are
enforced by bureaucratic agencies, their quality and e ciency should be an important
determinant of how likely firms get caught for their non-compliance behavior. Again,
I use the bureaucratic quality index from the ICRG data set, which measures each
country’s bureaucratic quality on a scale from 1 to 4 on the basis of expert surveys (4
means a good quality and 1 poor quality). Though this measure represents the overall
bureaucratic quality of the country, it is reasonable to use it for my purposes because
multiple agencies are often involved in enforcement of sanctions and thereby their
overall quality should be of interest to us. Using information from ICRG, a binary
variable E↵ective Bureaucracy is prepared, which takes a value of 1 if the sender
scores 4 on the ICRG’s bureaucratic quality variable, and 0 otherwise. All other
things being equal, E↵ective Bureaucracy should increase the chance that the target
acquiesces to the threat, decrease the chance that the sender imposes sanctions, and
increase the chance that imposed sanctions succeed.
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The second independent variable is Distance, which is the natural log of the
capital-to-capital distance between the sender and target. This variable relies on
the validity of the theoretical argument and empirical claims in the trade literature,
which comes to a clear consensus of a correlation between the distance between two
countries and the number of firms that engage in trade between them. The argument
is that the greater the distance between two countries, the fewer firms engage in trade
between those countries (e.g. Bernard et al. 2007, Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein
2008, Bernard, Jensen, Redding & Schott 2009, Bernard, Redding & Schott 2011).
Trade theorists argue that this is because the longer distance increases transaction
costs for trade, which prevents many, often smaller, firms from entering the market
(e.g. Melitz 2003, Yeaple 2005). The fewer firms involved in trade between the sender
and target, the easier it should be for the sender government to monitor these firms’
behavior. Because a greater distance between countries is related to having fewer
firms involved in the bilateral trade, the firms that are trading with distant targets
should fear getting caught for illicit trading. Therefore, ceteris paribus, greater
sender-target distance should increase the chance that the target acquiesces to the
threat, decrease the chance that the sender imposes sanctions, and increase the
chance that imposed sanctions succeed.
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Preference Alignment between Governments and Firms
The third independent variable is State-Owned Enterprise, which was also discussed
and used in Chapter 3. The idea behind the construction of this variable is that
state-owned corporations should care more about policy objectives sought after by
their governments than private ones do. Ideally, I would have information about the
degree of state-ownership of firms involved in trade with the target. However, because
I do not have access to data at the firm-level, I opt to use more aggregate data on
government investment as a share of total investment in countries from the Economic
Freedom of the World data set (Gwartney, Lawson & Block 1996, Gwartney, Lawson
& Norton 2008). Because the data are skewed, the natural log of the variable is used
for the analyses. Ceteris paribus, State-Owned Enterprise should increase the chance
that a threat succeeds and that imposed sanctions succeed.
Reputation Costs
The fourth independent variable is High Commitment. While the first three variables
are meant to capture the factors that influence firms’ behavior, the High Commitment
variable aims to reflect the senders’ reputation costs of backing down from threats.
While existing studies in international relations often use variables that reflect vari-
ation in political institutions (e.g. democracy vs. non-democracy) to capture these
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reputation costs, I consider the content of threats to determine whether the reputa-
tion costs are high (Krustev & Morgan 2011). In the context of economic sanctions,
senders are able to manipulate their language to demonstrate how committed they
are to imposing sanctions. Senders may use policy statements such as “we might act”
to imply other options are considered. In contrast, states also may adopt explicit
language such as “we will act” to signal high levels of commitment. The idea here
is that in cases where senders make high levels of commitment, they are likely to
su↵er from severe reputation costs of backpedaling. TIES includes a variable that
measures the strength of the sender’s commitment. TIES divides the strength of
commitment into three levels: weak, moderate, and strong. Weak threats suggest
that if the threat fails, the sender may consider imposing sanctions as a possible
option. Moderate and Strong threats suggest that if the target fails to alter a policy
behavior, the sender will consider or impose sanctions as a response. I consider the
sender committed if the sender made either moderate or strong statements when
they threatened the target.
Furthermore, Hypothesis 2.2.2 suggests that the relationship between sanctions
imposition and the probability of firms getting caught should be conditional on the
senders’ reputation costs. This means that the e↵ects of E↵ective Bureaucracy and
Distance on the chance that sanctions are imposed should depend on High Commit-
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ment. To this end, two interactive terms, E↵ective Bureaucracy⇥High Commitment
and Distance⇥High Commitment are included in the statistical analyses.
Value of Trade
The fifth independent variable is Trade Dependence. The logic behind this variable
lies in the argument that targets value trade with senders as the amount of the trade
increases. This variable is measured as the proportion of the volume of sender-target
trade over the target’s GDP from the year before sanctions started. To construct
this variable, data on countries’ GDP and bilateral trade volumes are drawn from
Gleditsch (2002). Because the data are highly skewed, the natural log of the variable
is used for the analyses. All things being equal, higher target trade dependence should
increase the chance that a threat succeeds, decrease the chance that sanctions are
imposed, and increase the chance that imposed sanctions succeed.
4.3 Empirical Results
Threat Success
The empirical results pertaining to Hypotheses 2.1.1 - 2.1.3 are summarized in Fig-
ure 4.1. I find strong support for the hypotheses. Concerning Hypothesis 2.1.1,
the coe cients of the E↵ective Bureaucracy and Distance are positive as predicted
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Figure 4.1 : Coe cients from Probit Regression of Threat Success: The
graph shows the regression coe cients from the estimated model (N = 319). Circles
show the point estimates, and horizontal line segments associated with circles show
the 95% confidence intervals. The coe cient on the intercept is omitted.
and statistically significant. This finding implies that threats are more likely to
succeed in changing target’s policy when the likelihood that firms get caught for
non-compliance is high. Concerning Hypothesis 2.1.2, the coe cient of the State-
Owned Enterprise variable is positive and statistically significant. This implies that
as the sender’s firms care more about the policy sought by their government, threats
are more likely to succeed. The coe cient of the Trade Dependence variable is also
positive and statistically significant as predicted. This finding supports Hypothesis
2.1.3, suggesting that the probability of successful threats increases as its trade with
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the sender becomes more important for the target.
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Figure 4.2 : Predicted Substantive E↵ects on the Probability of Threat
Success: Each panel presents the 95% confidence band of the e↵ect of each respective
variable on the probability that a threat succeeds. The 95% confidence interval at
each incremental step is based on 1,000 simulations. All other variables are held at
their medians.
Examining the substantive e↵ects of the variables not only confirms the conclu-
sions that have been drawn so far, but also sheds light on the magnitudes of these
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e↵ects. The four panels in Figure 4.2 represent the e↵ects of each independent vari-
able on the predicted probability of threat success. The top-left panel suggests that
having an e↵ective bureaucracy increases the baseline probability of threat success
by about 16%, on average. This e↵ect is strikingly strong, as are the e↵ects of other
variables in this figure. In the top-right panel, the e↵ect of distance is a steady in-
crease in the probability of interest, suggesting that threats against targets that are
far away are more likely to succeed. In the bottom-left panel, the e↵ect of the share
of state-owned enterprise increases rapidly in the range between 10% and 40% and
slowly increases beyond that. In the bottom-right panel, again, the e↵ect of target
trade dependence increases rapidly from 0 to 10, suggesting that targets who depend
on trade with the sender are more likely to give in to demands by the sender.
Impositions of Sanctions
The results pertaining to Hypotheses 2.2.1 - 2.2.4 are reported in Figure 4.3. The
results here largely support the predictions from the theoretical model. The specifica-
tion in Model 1 reported includes E↵ective Bureaucracy, Distance, Trade Dependence,
and High Commitmentto consider the unconditional e↵ects of these variables. In the
figure, the coe cient for e↵ective bureaucracy is negative and statistically significant
as predicated. However, the coe cient for distance is slightly positive, which is not
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Figure 4.3 : Coe cients from Probit Regressions of Sanctions Imposition:
The graph shows the regression coe cients from two estimated models (N = 229)
with two separate specifications: one without interactive terms (Model 1) and the
other with interactive terms (Model 2). Circles and triangles show the point esti-
mates, and horizontal line segments associated with each show the 95% confidence
intervals. The coe cient on the intercept is omitted.
consistent with Hypothesis 2.2.1, but it is very far from statistical significance. The
coe cient for the Trade Dependence variable is negative and it is in the predicted
direction, but fails to reach the conventional level of statistical significance. Finally,
the e↵ect of high commitment is positive and statistically significant, suggesting
that when threats are made with high commitment to impose sanctions, sanctions
are more likely to be imposed.
Figure 4.4 represents the substantive e↵ects of each variable on the predicted
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Figure 4.4 : Predicted Substantive E↵ects on the Probability of Sanctions
Imposition: Each panel presents the 95% confidence band of the e↵ect of each
respective variable on the probability that a sanction is imposed. The 95% confidence
interval at each incremental step is based on 1,000 simulations. All other variables
are held at their medians.
probability that sanctions are imposed. The top-left panel confirms my earlier find-
ing, suggesting that when the sender has an e↵ective bureaucracy, he is about 15%
less likely to impose sanctions given threats have failed. The top-right panel con-
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firms the earlier finding that there seems to be no systematic relationship between the
sender-target distance and the probability of impositions. In Figure 4, the coe cient
of the trade dependence variable was not significant; but, the bottom-right panel
suggests that though the relationship is weak, a 10% increase in target trade depen-
dence (which is roughly a standard deviation in my sample) decreases the chance
that the sender imposes sanctions by 10%, which is substantively significant. Fi-
nally, the bottom-right panel shows that when the sender demonstrates a high level
of commitment in making threats, the sender is 15% more likely to impose sanctions
as predicted.
Concerning the conditional e↵ects of two variables, E↵ective Bureaucracy and
Distance, on High Commitment, the results in Figure 4.3 appear somewhat mixed.
According to the theory, the sender governments are forced to make decisions to im-
pose sanctions when reputation costs are high. So, we expect two variables, E↵ective
Bureaucracy and Distance, to a↵ect the senders’ decisions only when senders have
made a strong commitment to impose sanctions. The coe cients on both E↵ective
Bureaucracy and the interaction between E↵ective Bureaucracy and High Commit-
ment are negative. This suggests that whether or not the sender has an e↵ective
bureaucracy has a stronger, negative e↵ect on sender willingness to impose sanc-
tions when he makes a stronger commitment. This interaction is in the predicted
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direction, but is not statistically significant. Similarly, the coe cient on Distance is
positive and the interaction is negative, but neither is statically significant. With
non-linear models with interactions at hand, it is di cult to determine when the ac-
tual e↵ects of variables are positive, negative, or indistinguishable from zero despite
their estimated coe cients. To interpret these conditional results fully, I calculated
the substantive e↵ects of E↵ective Bureaucracy and Distance at di↵erent values of
the High Commitment variable. More specifically, for the E↵ective Bureaucracy vari-
able, I simulate Pr(Imposition = 1|E↵ective Bureaucracy = 1)   Pr(Imposition =
1|E↵ective Bureaucracy = 0) as I set High Commitment at either 0 or 1, holding all
other variables at their medians. Similarly, I simulate Pr(Imposition = 1|Distance =
mean+ one s.d) Pr(Imposition = 1|Distance = mean) for each value that High Com-
mitment can take. Positive marginal e↵ects mean that the variable has a positive
impact on the probability of sanctions impositions while negative marginal e↵ects
mean the opposite.
Figure 4.5 indicates how the marginal e↵ects of two independent variables change
when threats are made with di↵erent levels of commitment. In the left panel, we see
that when the commitment level is high, the marginal e↵ect of E↵ective Bureaucracy
is negative, meaning that senders with e↵ective bureaucracies are less likely to im-
pose sanctions. This e↵ect is distinguishable from zero. When the commitment level
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Figure 4.5 : Marginal E↵ects of E↵ective Bureaucracy and Distance by Lev-
els of Commitment: Each panel presents the 95% confidence band of the marginal
e↵ect of each respective variable on the probability that a sanction is imposed. The
95% confidence interval at each incremental step is based on 1,000 simulations. All
other variables are held at their medians.
is low, the marginal e↵ect of the variable is still negative, but the confidence interval
crosses the zero line, suggesting that the relationship is very weak. These findings
support the prediction that when the reputation cost is high, the influence of bureau-
cratic e↵ectiveness becomes stronger. In the right panel, while the e↵ect of distance
is negative when the commitment level is high, this e↵ect is indistinguishable from
zero, suggesting that the relationship is quite weak. When the commitment level is
low, the marginal e↵ect of distance appears positive, which indicates that the sender
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is more likely to impose sanctions when the target is far away. Though the interactive
e↵ect is in the predicted direction in that the marginal e↵ect of distance becomes
more negative as the commitment level becomes higher, my finding that longer dis-
tance increases the chance that the sender imposes sanctions is not consistent with
my theory.
In sum, I find mixed evidence concerning the e↵ect of sender-target distance on
senders’ decisions to impose sanctions. However, my results also exhibit significant
results for my predictions about the e↵ects of senders’ bureaucratic quality and
strong commitment on the probability that they will impose sanctions. Moreover, I
find evidence for the interactive e↵ect between these two variables.
Success of Imposed Sanctions
The results pertaining to Hypotheses 2.3.1 - 2.3.3 are reported in Figure 4.6. The
results indicate that my theory is on the right track. The estimated coe cient for
e↵ective bureaucracy is positive, suggesting that when the sender’s bureaucracy is
e↵ective, imposed sanctions are more likely to be successful; but it fails to meet the
conventional level of statistical significance. The e↵ect of sender-target distance is
again in the predicted direction, but it is far from statistical significance. The e↵ect
of the State-Owned Enterprise variable is positive and statistically significant, which
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Figure 4.6 : Coe cients from Probit Regression of Sanctions Success: The
graph shows the regression coe cients from the estimated model (N = 119). Circles
show the point estimates, and horizontal line segments associated with circles show
the 95% confidence intervals. The coe cient on the intercept is omitted.
suggests that when state-owned enterprises represent a large share of the sender
government investment, sanctions are more likely to succeed. Finally, the coe cient
for the Trade Dependence variable is positive and significant.
All together, the results concerning the success of imposed sanctions may not
appear strongly supportive; however, this is not very surprising from empirical or
theoretical perspectives. First, the number of cases in this particular analysis is only
119. With this small number of observations, it may be hard to find results that
are statistically significant. Second, the theory provides an explanation for these
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Figure 4.7 : Predicted Substantive E↵ects on the Probability that Imposed
Sanctions Succeed: Each panel presents the 95% confidence band of the e↵ect of
each respective variable on the probability that an imposed sanction succeeds. The
95% confidence interval at each incremental step is based on 1,000 simulations. All
other variables are held at their medians.
seemingly weak results. Recall that, in the model, governments incorporate their
expectations about the behavior of firms into their decisions at stages prior to sanc-
tions impositions. This is why the success of threats were found to be systematically
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related to the factors identified in the model. Consequently, the theory suggests that
much ‘action’ takes place prior to impositions. Thus, the behavior of firms should
not have particularly strong e↵ects on the target’s decisions at the last stage of the
game. In light of these insights, the findings that the estimated e↵ects all went in
the expected directions strongly support the model.
Instead, it is rather surprising that I find strong e↵ects for some variables, given
what the theory predicts. For example, consider the substantive e↵ect of the state-
owned enterprise variable in Figure 4.7. I find that sanctions imposed by a govern-
ment which spends 40% of its total investment on state-owned enterprise are about
four times more likely to succeed than those by a government which spends only
10%. This e↵ect of state-owned enterprises is much stronger than the one I find in
the analysis of threats success. These findings together point to an interesting possi-
bility: some target governments may not take into account the degree of state-owned
corporations in senders’ territories when making decisions at the threat stage. The-
oretically, it is puzzling why the target governments would fail to incorporate such
information into decision making, but the findings here suggest that the consequence
of failing to consider this factor at the threat stage can be quite detrimental on the
part of targets.
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter presented a series of empirical tests of the game-theoretic model ad-
vanced in Chapter 2. The first set of tested hypotheses, stating that threats are more
successful when firms see higher risk in violating sanction policies and care about
foreign policy outcomes, have been strongly supported by the data. First, threats
initiated by senders with e↵ective bureaucracies were found to be more successful.
Second, threats were found to be more likely to succeed as the number of firms in-
volved in sender-target trade decreased. Third, it was found that threats are more
successful if the sender governments own more of their firms.
The second set of hypotheses have enjoyed partial support. One hypothesis stated
that the senders are more likely to impose sanctions when the firms do not see it
risky to evade sanctions. The support for this hypothesis was partial, as while the
senders’ bureaucratic quality measure had strong, significant e↵ects as expected, the
e↵ect of the distance measure was found to be insignificant. On the other hand, I
found strong support for another hypothesis, stating that there are reputation costs
associated with the senders more likely to impose sanctions when backing down from
their own threats.
The third set of analyses have provided support for several hypotheses. This set of
hypotheses stated that imposed sanctions are more successful when the firms see high
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risk in evading sanctions and care about policy outcomes. First, the bureaucratic
quality and distance variables had e↵ects in the expected directions, but these e↵ects
were not very strong. This is in fact theoretically justified. Due to the target’s
strategic, forward-looking considerations, the theory implied that the e↵ects of these
variables should not be strong. However, surprisingly, the state-owned enterprise
variable had a very strong e↵ect on the success of imposed sanctions.
In sum, this chapter presents fairly strong support for the model, especially given
that some of these non-intuitive implications seem to be supported. Combined with
the empirical findings in Chapter 3, which confirmed the mediating e↵ect of firms on
the carrying out of sanction policies, the findings here suggest that states do not make
decisions with an expectation that sanctions automatically generate economic harm
against the target. Rather they do so by anticipating and evaluating how enforcement
may a↵ect compliance decisions by firms. Therefore, the central conclusion emerging
from this analysis is that a complete understanding of economic sanctions requires
an inclusion of sanction enforcement as part of the whole sanction process.
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Chapter 5
Enforcement Problem and the Design of Economic
Sanctions: Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism
5.1 Introduction
In the previous three chapters, I presented my main theoretical framework and sta-
tistical analyses of some of the hypotheses derived from the theory. I focused on
how the enforcement of sanctions policies and firms’ compliance behavior influence
governments’ decisions during the sanctions processes, such as a sender’s decision
to impose sanctions and a target’s decision to give into the sender’s demand. The
empirical results were generally supportive of the theory. However, the theoretical as
well as empirical investigations in the previous chapters overlook one important as-
pect of economic sanctions: the design of economic sanctions. The theory presented
in Chapter 2 focused on a particular scenario in which sanctions can be imposed
by one sender, that is, sanctions are unilateral. For example, the theory shows that
when firms are anticipated to evade sanction policies, the sender is more likely to
impose unilateral sanctions. However, one interesting political problem, and per-
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haps the most heated debated, has to do with whether or not to pursue multilateral
sanctions. In this chapter, I analyze the sender’s decision to sanction multilaterally
rather than unilaterally.
At first glance, it may seem that states should always want to sanction multilat-
erally. There is a widespread belief among policymakers that multilateral support
is crucial to coerce other states to change their policy behavior. Some go so far as
to claim that U.S. unilateral sanctions have never worked and sanctions can only be
e↵ective if they are applied multilaterally. Multilateral sanctions are believed to be
more e↵ective because they should impose greater costs on the target by disrupt-
ing more trade to the target and because multilateral e↵orts should make it more
di cult for the target to find alternative markets and suppliers in the international
system. In addition, greater numbers of countries and institutions supporting a
sanctions e↵ort may increase its capacity for moral suasion. This optimistic belief
about multilateral e↵orts was so strong among scholars that many did not question
its validity. For example, Gilpin (1984) states “Whereas positive leverage is usually
a unilateral action, negative leverage in almost all cases must be multilateral. To
be e↵ective, other states must give it their support” (639). These proponents of
multilateral sanctions also point out unilateral sanctions are not attractive because
they inevitably hurt the sender’s domestic economy and possibly cause long-term
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harm to the companies that do business with foreign nations (e.g. Hufbauer, Schott
& Elliott 1990, Hufbauer et al. 1997).
Despite its apparent advantages, however, states often do not sanction multilat-
erally. Even more puzzling is that sanctions scholars have found mixed evidence con-
cerning the e↵ect of multilateral cooperation on the e↵ectiveness of sanctions. Some
find that unilateral sanctions are actually more e↵ective than unilateral sanctions
(Lam 1990, Bonetti 1998, Dehejia & Wood 1992, van Bergeijk 1994, Hufbauer, Schott
& Elliott 1990), while other find multilateral sanctions may be more e↵ective than
unilateral sanctions (Morgan, Bapat & Krustev 2009, Bapat & Morgan 2009, McLean
& Whang 2010). These mixed conclusions suggest that, in order to understand how
di↵erent forms of sanctions a↵ect the outcomes of sanctions, we need to first better
understand states’ choices between unilateral and multilateral sanctions.
In this chapter, I introduce a simple theoretical framework that characterizes
sender states’ choices between multilateral and unilateral sanctions. This theory
is built on two related insights gained from looking at the enforcement aspect of
economic sanctions. First, I draw on an insight from the previous chapters that,
under some conditions, unilateral sanctions can succeed in changing a target’s policy.
In particular, when unilateral sanctions are expected to be enforced, they are more
likely to change target’s policy behavior. This implies that states do not always
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need to resort to multilateralism in order to succeed in achieving their international
objectives.
The second insight has to do with enforcement problems which are unique to
the context of multilateral sanctions. The enforcement of multilateral sanctions is
di cult for the primary sender because other states in a coalition may be reluctant to
enforce sanctions policies or, even when they are serious about sanctions enforcement,
most states lack the bureaucratic capacity and resources to enforce them. Indeed, this
very problem has been proposed as the key explanation for the failure of multilateral
sanctions (Martin 1993, Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1999, Drezner 2000). However, I
argue that some primary senders are able to solve this problem by helping their co-
senders’ enforcement activities through providing them with resources and sta↵s,
through monitoring co-senders’ firms, and through sharing the information with
them. This implies that states with the capacity to perform such tasks are able to
impose e↵ective multilateral sanctions, and, thereby, they are more likely to pursue
sanctioning multilaterally.
My theoretical argument, again, highlights the importance of enforcement in
states’ choices in sanctions episodes. More specifically, a sender’s choice between
multilateral vs. unilateral sanctions depends crucially on the expected di culty of
enforcing the respective types of sanctions. If unilateral sanctions are expected to
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be enforced, the primary sender chooses unilateral sanctions. If not, the sender is
more likely to pursue multilateral sanctions, but only if they are expected to be
enforceable. Consistent with my arguments, I find empirical evidence that primary
senders are more likely to choose multilateralism when it is expected to be di cult
to enforce unilateral sanctions. Also, I find that when the enforcement problem
with multilateral sanctions can be mitigated, multilateral sanctions are chosen over
unilateral sanctions.
Below, I first present my theoretical argument, which relates the enforcement
problems of unilateral and multilateral sanctions to primary senders’ design choices.
Then, I provide two sets of empirical analyses.
5.2 Enforcement Problems in Multilateral Sanctions
To be consistent with the literature, I call the sanctioning states ‘senders’ and sanc-
tioned states ‘targets.’ In the context of multilateral sanctions, there is usually one
state that is primarily responsible for mobilizing other states to impose sanctions.
I refer to this state as a ‘primary sender’ and to the other states in a multilateral
coalition as ‘co-senders.’
Why don’t states always pursue to impose multilateral sanctions if most policy-
makers believe that they increase the chance of achieving their sought-after foreign
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policy goals? To systematically analyze this question, I first discuss costs and con-
cerns involved in building multilateral coalitions. Although existing work primarily
focuses on the question of sanctions e↵ectiveness, it provides us with some insight
into this question. Broadly, prior work suggests three types of concerns about impos-
ing sanctions multilaterally. First, because states often have di↵erent preferences on
the disputed issues, including other states in a multilateral sanctioning coalition and
maintaining it requires some compromises on the part of the primary sender (Miers
& Morgan 2002, Bapat & Morgan 2009).
Second, because potential co-senders are often unwilling to join multilateral sanc-
tion coalitions, the primary sender must use a variety of costly measures such as
threats and issue linkages to coerce them to cooperate (Martin 1993). For example,
when the United States formed a coalition to impose sanctions against Iran in 1979,
it persuaded Japan to join its sanctioning coalition by promising to provide Alaskan
oil in exchange (Miyagawa 1992).
The third issue with multilateral sanctions has to do with the enforcement of
multilateral sanctions. There is one critical di↵erence between the enforcement of
multilateral and unilateral sanctions. In the previous chapters, I discussed the prob-
lems in enforcing unilateral sanctions. The enforcement of unilateral sanctions is
targeted at a sender’s own domestic firms. In contrast, the enforcement of multilat-
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eral sanctions concerns other states (e.g. co-senders) as well as their firms. Because
coalition members are in charge of the enforcement of their own sanction policies,
the primary sender has to make sure the co-senders’ sanction policies are enforced
and their firms are deterred from continuing trade with the target.
This is problematic for the primary sender, who wants to ensure that co-senders’
sanctions are enforced vigorously, for two reasons. First, co-senders are often reluc-
tant to enforce sanctions even when they agree to impose sanctions with the primary
sender (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1999). This is because strict enforcement of sanc-
tion policies would lead to a loss of trade. Second, even when co-senders are actually
willing to enforce sanctions, they may not be capable of e↵ectively doing so, which
leads to their domestic firms evading sanctions policies.
To solve this problem, the primary sender can use a variety of means to ensure
that co-senders’ sanctions are enforced. In cases in which co-senders are willing to
enforce sanctions, there are three mechanisms through which primary senders can
help them enforce their sanction policies. The first mechanism is to provide finan-
cial resources and technical support for sanction enforcement. For example, when
U.N. sanctions were imposed against Yugoslavia in 1992, policy makers soon be-
came concerned about the lack of enforcement capacity by the countries surrounding
Yugoslavia, which became transshipment hubs for foreign firms that traded with
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Yugoslavia (Garfield 2001). In response, the United States provided these neigh-
boring countries with financial as well as technical support specifically to enforce
sanctions. This concern also led the United States, European states, and Canada
to organize a network of sanctions assistance missions (SAMs), through which their
customs o cials were dispatched at border posts (Cortright & Lopez 2002). These
missions were coordinated via a Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Cen-
ter (SAMCOMM), which was equipped with computerized satellite communication
systems that made it easier for customs o cials to verify documents. This network of
strict enforcement made it costly for foreign firms to trade with Yugoslavia. Accord-
ing to one UN report, the SAMs contributed to a great reduction of transshipments
through these neighboring countries and made the sanctions “the most e↵ective of
the post-Cold War sanctions regimes.” (Garfield 2001: 64).
The second mechanism is information-sharing. Information is critical for e↵ective
enforcement of sanctions, but collecting reliable information requires a significant
amount of time, e↵ort, and expertise on the part of enforcement agencies. In many
violation cases, a lack of information leads to dismissals of sanctions violations cases
because they cannot prove that violations actually occurred. The primary sender can
help by sharing information about firms who violate the other co-senders’ sanctions.
For example, in late 1986, when it became known to the Japanese government that
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its firm, Toshiba Machine, violated the CoCom export control rules, the Japanese
government first dismissed this case because reliable information was not available.
Later on, evidence for this case was provided by the United States o cials, which
led the Japanese government to take action against the firm (Bertsch 1988).1
The third mechanism through which the primary sender can facilitate sanctions
enforcement is by making it physically di cult for firms to ship goods to the target
or transship them through other locations. Primary senders could even resort to
military means to enhance sanctions enforcement. This was what the United King-
dom did in the case of U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. One serious problem in
this case was the circumvention of the oil embargo through Rhodesia’s neighboring
countries. In particular, knowing that Mozambique lacked a su cient enforcement
capacity, many foreign firms continued shipping oil to Rhodesian refineries through
Beira, a port of Mozambique. Being frustrated with the situation, Britain decided to
help enforcing the sanction by stationing two frigates o↵ Beira. The primary task for
these frigates was to interdict oil tankers approaching Beria (Mobley 2002).2 From
1 “Shock Waves from Toshiba-Soviet Deal still Rattle Japan,” Los Angels Times, 11 August
1987, http://articles.latimes.com/1987-08-11/business/fi-659_1_soviet-union.
2 This blockade e↵ort initially proved to be somewhat ine cient because Britain was required
to obtain permission from the tankers’ flag states to stop them. Shortly after the start of
the blockade, Britain was granted authority, under UN Resolution 221, to undertake maritime
interception operations o↵ Beira. After the passage of Resolution 221, Britain no longer needed
permission from the tankers’ flag states for interceptions, which made their operations more
e cient.
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1966 to 1971, the naval force was reported to have intercepted forty-seven oil tankers
(Mobley 2002). By blocking the primary route for evading sanctions, the blockade
by the UK contributed to the e↵ectiveness of sanctions enforcement.
These mechanisms are often useful in ensuring that co-senders’ sanctions are
enforced if the co-senders are willing to enforce sanctions but are not capable of
doing so e↵ectively. What if the co-senders are reluctant to enforce sanctions in
the first place? The primary sender must o↵er co-senders an incentive to enforce
sanctions. One way to do so is by threatening sanctions against them or by directly
sanctioning their firms (Shambaugh 1999). For example, in May 1982, the United
States fined International Computers Limited (ICL) of Great Britain for violating
the CoCom export control regulations and threatened to place it on the U.S. Export
Denial Lists.
This variety of mechanisms through which the primary sender ensures strict en-
forcement of multilateral sanctions requires a substantial amount of resources as well
as its capability to implement them. Clearly, to provide financial resources to in-
crease a co-sender’s ability to enforce sanctions, the primary sender needs resources.
All of the other mechanisms require resources because collecting information about
foreign firms’ behavior, erecting physical blockades, and threatening and imposing
sanctions against foreign firms for their non-cooperation are all costly measures.
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Second, what is also crucial here is the primary sender’s ability to implement each
measure. Providing technical support presupposes that the primary sender already
has competent, well-trained sta↵ in the implementation of sanctions as well as in-
stitutionalized procedures for doing so. Similarly, collecting information as well as
blocking a smuggling network requires such a capability.
So far, I have discussed the costs and concerns associated with forming and main-
taining e↵ective multilateral coalitions by highlighting the issues with implementa-
tion of multilateral sanctions. In contrast to existing work, which claims that the
enforcement problem undermines the e↵ectiveness of multilateral sanctions, I have
argued here that the primary sender often aims to solve this problem by coordinating
the enforcement of multilateral sanctions. This discussion suggests that the primary
sender’s financial as well as technical abilities to enforce multilateral sanctions are
important in forming and maintaining e↵ective multilateral coalitions. Below, based
on these insights, I will move on to discuss how primary senders decide to form a
multilateral sanctioning coalition.
5.3 Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism
The primary sender’s choice between multilateral and unilateral sanctions depends
on three things: costs involved in forming a coalition, his ability to help enforce
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sanctions abroad, and the target’s decisions. So far, I have discussed the issues
involved in imposing multilateral sanctions and sender states’ ability to help enforce
sanctions abroad. However, also important is the target’s decisions or her anticipated
response to sanctions pressure.
In a strategic context, a primary sender incorporates the target’s anticipated de-
cisions into his calculation. In a sanction episode, the target’s decision is to acquiesce
to the sanction pressure or to stand firm. Her decision depends on how costly sanc-
tions are to her and how important the disputed policy is. I assume that whether
or not sanctions are unilateral or multilateral does not directly influence the target’s
decision. In other words, what matters for the target is how costly the sanctions are,
and not which state or how many states are imposing them. Given this assumption,
it follows that the target is more likely to give in to sanctions pressure if they are
more costly.
When deciding whether to sanction multilaterally or unilaterally, the primary
sender anticipates the target’s responses to both types of sanctions and choose the
one that is most e cient in achieving his goal. To discuss the primary sender’s choice
in more detail, I consider the following two cases: 1. when unilateral sanctions are
expected to be e↵ective in coercing the target to change her policy and 2. when
unilateral sanctions are expected not to be e↵ective.
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First, when the primary sender anticipates that the target will give in to uni-
lateral sanction pressure, the primary sender always prefer unilateral sanctions to
multilateral ones. In the previous section, I argue that multilateral sanctions are
costly for the primary sender. The primary sender would rather not pay the cost of
forming and maintaining a sanctioning coalition if unilateral sanctions su ce.
Second, when unilateral sanctions are expected not to be severe enough for the
target to give in, the primary sender has the option of pursuing multilateral sanc-
tions. His decisions depend crucially on three di↵erent kinds of costs and issues I
have mentioned earlier: compromise, concessions, and the issues with enforcement.
Here, I focus on the latter two. Giving concessions to gain cooperation can be ex-
pensive, but the price the primary sender needs to o↵er to a co-sender depends on
the importance of its trade with the target and the value of rents it can extract from
busting sanctions.
First, because joining multilateral coalitions and imposing sanctions means re-
stricting its trade with the target, the o↵er the primary sender proposes has to
compensate for the foregone trade. Thus, the more important a co-sender’s trade
with the target, the more expensive it becomes to form a coalition.
Second, the value of concessions the primary sender makes to the potential co-
sender also has to account for the sanction rent that state could extract from busting
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sanctions. Impositions of sanctions create rents for all third-party states and actors
(Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1999). Any potential co-sender is also a potential sanction-
buster who might replace some of the target’s forgone trade caused by the primary-
sender’s sanctions. Given the high incentives to bust sanctions, the primary sender
has to compensate its co-sender for this opportunity cost, increasing the price that
the primary sender has to pay to the potential co-sender.
The primary sender’s decision to pursue sanctions multilaterally is also influenced
by the issues with enforcing multilateral sanctions. The primary sender may pay
enough in concessions so that other states join the coalition, but he also has to make
sure that the co-senders enforce sanctions strictly. Thus, whether or not the primary
sender pursues multilateral sanctions depends on his ability to enforce sanctions
abroad.
This discussion leads to the central theoretical result. That is, the primary sender
is more likely to pursue multilateral sanctions if he anticipates that unilateral sanc-
tions will not change the target’s policy, cooperation from the potential co-senders
is cheap to buy, and he has the ability to makes sure that sanctions by co-senders
are enforced. Based on this key result, I derive several testable hypotheses, which I
subject to empirical tests in later sections.
The primary sender is more likely to sanction multilaterally if unilateral sanc-
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tions are expected not to work. In the previous chapters, I argued and provided
evidence that, under certain conditions, unilateral sanctions can actually be e↵ec-
tive in changing the target’s behavior in the sender’s favor. One such condition is
when the target cares about the trade relationship with the sender su ciently more
compared to its disputed policy. If her trade with the sender is so important that
unilateral sanctions will change her policy behavior, then the primary sender would
not pursue rather costly multilateral sanctions. This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.1 All else equal, as the target cares more about the primary sender-
target trade relationship, the primary sender is less likely to choose multilateral
sanctions over unilateral sanctions.
Another condition under which unilateral sanctions are likely to work is when the
target anticipates the primary senders’ firms’ compliance with sanction policies (i.e.
enforcement of unilateral sanctions is not di cult). For example, I find that when
the number of firms is small in the sender-target trade, the sender government has
an easy time enforcing unilateral sanctions and thereby the target is more likely to
give into the demand. Thus, if the enforcement of unilateral sanctions is expected to
be less challenging, the primary sender is less likely to pursue multilateral sanctions.
This insight also leads to another observable implication. If sanctions are multilat-
eral, then sanctions by the primary sender should be enforced less e↵ectively than if
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sanctions were unilateral.
Hypothesis 5.2 All else equal, as the enforcement of unilateral sanctions against
the target becomes more di cult, the primary sender is more likely to choose
multilateral sanctions over unilateral sanctions.
Hypothesis 5.3 Primary sender’s sanctions are enforced less e↵ectively when they
are imposed multilaterally than when they are imposed unilaterally.
The main result also suggests that the primary sender is more likely to sanction
multilaterally if the cost of making concessions to the co-senders is low. This, in turn,
suggests that wealthy states should be able to pursue multilateral sanctions because
they have an easier time buying o↵ other states to join multilateral sanctioning
coalitions. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.4 All else equal, the primary sender is more likely to choose multi-
lateral sanctions over unilateral sanctions as his wealth increases.
Lastly, the primary sender is more likely to pursue multilateral sanctions if he
has the ability to help enforce sanctions abroad. The primary sender can employ a
variety of mechanisms to make sure the enforcement of sanctions is su cient. One
important factor determining the primary sender’s ability to help enforce sanctions is
his wealth. Because providing financial resources and deploying troops to physically
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blockade smuggling networks requires a significant amount of resources, wealthy pri-
mary senders are expected to pursue multilateral sanctions when they like to, which
leads to the same implication expressed in Hypothesis 5.4. However, the primary
sender’s enforcement ability also depends on other factors, such as the competency
of his bureaucratic agencies or enforcement sta↵. The primary sender with existing
competent and skilled enforcement experts can send them to co-senders who need
specific knowledge and skills to enforce sanctions e↵ectively. These existing, e↵ective
bureaucrats and expertise are also useful in collecting and sharing information with
their counterparts in co-sender states, which facilitates the e↵ectiveness of enforce-
ment. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5.5 All else equal, the primary sender is more likely to choose multilat-
eral sanctions over unilateral sanctions if he has an e↵ective bureaucracy than
if he does not.
5.4 Empirical Analysis I
I first show a simple empirical test of Hypothesis 5.3. The hypothesis states that
the levels of enforcement of primary senders’ sanctions vary depending on whether
they are sanctioning alone or with other states. More specifically, when sanctions
are imposed unilaterally, sanctions by the primary sender are expected to depress
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his trade with the target more than they would if they were imposed multilaterally.
To test this hypothesis, I restrict my quantitative analysis to the cases from 1971
to 2000 in which the U.S. was the primary sender.3 I analyze the e↵ect of U.S.
(primary sender) sanctions on its bilateral trade relationships with other countries.
The unit of analysis for examination is a country in a given year, or country-year.
The dependent variable for this analysis is the natural log of U.S. bilateral trade with
country j in year t (ln(US Trade)jt). The data on bilateral trade were obtained from
Gleditsch (2002) and deflated to 2000 U.S. dollars using the U.S. Consumer Price
Index.4
I use the TIES data set (Morgan, Bapat & Krustev 2009) to identify sanctions
episodes in which the U.S. was a primary sender.5 I use four additional decision
rules to restrict the sample of sanctions. First, because my argument addresses the
e↵ect of imposed sanctions, rather than threats, I excluded all the episodes in which
sanctions were not imposed. Second, because my argument considers the e↵ects of
3 I only analyze the U.S. cases here because including di↵erent primary-senders in a sample would
introduce heterogeneity in the primary-sender sample, which makes it di cult to interpret re-
sults. U.S. cases are the most ideal because the U.S. imposed many unilateral and multilateral
sanctions–a total of 345 between 1971 and 2000, 43 of which were multilateral. Other coun-
tries either have not imposed many sanctions or focused on either sanctioning unilaterally or
multilaterally.
4 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: www.bls.gov/cpi/.
5 The primary sender is defined as a state that “proposes sanctions, initiates the threat, or
is responsible for mobilizing other states to initiate sanctions.” (TIES Codebook: http:
//www.unc.edu/~bapat/Codebook.pdf).
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trade sanctions, I exclude non-trade sanctions such as termination of foreign aid,
asset freezes, and travel bans. Third, to preseve the similarities in the severity of the
actual sanctions policies between unilateral and multilateral sanctions, I include only
cases where issues were security-related. This is because sanction policies tend to be
more modest in cases with disputed issues related to environmental or trade practices
in comparison to cases where issues are security-related. In addition, cases over trade
and environmental issues rarely become multilateral in general and the U.S. has never
had such a case. Fourth, I exclude sanction cases that did not last longer than three
months. Using these decision rules, the data set contains 46 sanctions episodes (186
sanction-years) between 1971 and 2000.
Using these U.S. sanction cases, I first construct my key independent variables.
In order to see whether a sanction has any impact on U.S. trade with the target, I
code whether or not there was a U.S. sanction against the country in time period
t (Sanctionjt).6 To investigate whether U.S. sanctions are enforced more e↵ectively
when they are unilateral rather than multilateral, I code whether or not there was
a U.S. multilateral sanction against the country in time period t (Multilateraljt).
Using information about additional senders in TIES, I code a sanction as multilateral
when states other than the U.S. were involved in a sanction e↵ort. According to my
6 In addition, I adopted the principle that, for a particular country-year to be coded 1, a sanction
had to be in place for longer than ten months. In other words, if a sanction started after
November 1st or ended before March 1st in a given year, that country-year would be coded 0.
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argument, U.S. sanctions will be negatively related to U.S. trade with a country, and
this impact of sanctions will be smaller if sanctions become multilateral.
To estimate the e↵ect of sanctions on bilateral trade, I again use the gravity
model of international trade. I specify the gravity model in the following way:
ln(US Trade)j,t = ↵0 + ↵t +  0Sanctionj,t +  1Multilateralj,t +  2Institutionj,t+
 3ln(Distance)US,j +  4ln(GDP)US,t +  5ln(GDP)j,t+
 6ln(Pop)US,t +  7ln(Pop)j,t +  8DemUS,t +  9Demj,t+
 10DefenseUS,j,t + ✏i,j,t
(5.1)
ln(Distance)i,j denotes the natural log of the capital-capital distance between country
i and country j. This variable is included in the gravity model to capture the idea
of transaction costs in trading activities. As the distance between two countries
increases, transaction costs involved in trade should increase; thus, I expect the
distance variable to be negatively related to total trade between these two countries.
The data on distance was obtained from Stinnett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer & Gochman
(2002). ln(GDP)i,t is the natural log of the gross domestic product (GDP) of country
i in time period t. This variable is used to proxy the size of the nation’s economy
within the gravity model. Thus, this GDP variables should be positively related to
total trade. The data are obtained from Gleditsch (2002). ln(Pop)j,t denotes the
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natural log of the population of country i in time period t. In the gravity framework,
this variable represents the size of the nation’s market. I expect this population
variable to be positively associated with total trade. The data on populations are
also obtained from Gleditsch (2002). Demi,t is a dummy variable that takes a value
of 1 if country i is a democracy. This variable is coded 1 if country i scores six or
higher on the Polity IV democracy scale (Marshall & Jaggers 2005). I expect these
democracy variables to be positively related to total trade. Defensei,j,t is a dummy
variable that is coded 1 if a pair of countries has a defense pact with one another. The
data I use to code this variable is from the ATOP dataset (Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell
& Long 2002). I expect the defense pact variable to be positively related to total
trade (e.g. Long 2003). To account for heterogeneity across time, I have included
year dummy variables. Similarly, I also include, in some models, country-specific
dummy variables (for the U.S. trade analyses) to account for heterogeneity across
U.S. trading partners (e.g. Tomz, Goldstein & Rivers 2007).
Empirical Results I
Table 5.1 presents results from my analysis of U.S. bilateral trade with other states.
Models 1 and 2 are pooled-OLS regressions whereas Models 3 and 4 control for
country-specific e↵ects. As was expected, U.S. sanctions in general appear to reduce
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trade between the U.S. and its targets. In Models 1 and 3, which include U.S.
sanctions variables as well as other control variables, the negative coe cient on U.S.
sanctions indicate reduction in trade between the U.S. and its sanction target. When
U.S. sanctions are multilateral, U.S. trade with the target does not decrease as much
as it would if they were imposed unilaterally. This is shown by the positive coe cient
on the Multilateral variable in Models 2 and 4.
To demonstrate these findings more clearly, I simulated the percentage changes
in U.S. trade due to a sanction using Model 4. In Figure 5.1, unilateral sanctions on
average reduce U.S. trade with the target by 66%. But, when sanction are imposed
multilaterally, the U.S. sanction does not appear to reduce as much of its trade with
the target as it would if sanctions were unilateral.
These findings are consistent with my theoretical argument. When sanctions are
imposed multilaterally, they are not enforced as strictly as they would be if they were
imposed unilaterally. This evidence is consistent with the argument that primary
senders choose multilateral sanctions when the enforcement of unilateral sanctions
is expected to be di cult.
113
Table 5.1 : Analysis of U.S. Trade Levels
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sanctionj,t  2.20⇤⇤  2.98⇤⇤  0.95⇤⇤  1.14⇤⇤
(0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.11)
Multilateralj,t 1.90⇤⇤ 0.39⇤⇤
(0.22) (0.14)
ln(Distance)US,j  0.25⇤⇤  0.30⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.05)
ln(Pop)US,t  0.12  0.81
(25.93) (25.71)
ln(Pop)j,t 0.86
⇤⇤ 0.85⇤⇤  0.01  0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.18) (0.18)
ln(GDP)US,t 0.47 0.69
(10.83) (10.74)
ln(GDP)j,t 1.31
⇤⇤ 1.33⇤⇤ 1.02⇤⇤ 1.02⇤⇤
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
DefenseUS,j,t 1.06⇤⇤ 1.04⇤⇤ 0.18 0.18
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.11)
Demj,t 0.13⇤ 0.12⇤ 0.16⇤⇤ 0.16⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant  13.63  7.00  2.67⇤  2.70⇤
(212.12) (210.29) (1.24) (1.24)
Observations 4323 4323 4323 4323
Note: Coe cients of the year- and country-specific dummy
variables are not reported due to space consideration.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed tests ⇤p < .05, ⇤ ⇤ p < .001.
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Figure 5.1 : Percentage Changes in U.S. Trade due to Di↵erent Types of
Sanctions: The vertical axis depicts the impact of a sanction on the U.S. trade
as a percentage change. Negative values represent a disruption in trade. The bars
represent the 95% confidence intervals; the points represent the mean percentage
change.
5.5 Empirical Analysis II
In this section, I test the rest of the implications from the model. Namely, I test
Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5, which relate various factors to the likelihood that
primary senders choose to sanction multilaterally rather than unilaterally. Consis-
tent with the theoretical model, the unit of analysis is a sanction-case. Because I am
interested in analyzing the primary senders’ choices between multilateral and unilat-
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eral sanctions, the dependent variable Multilateral specifies whether or not a primary
sender pursued multilateral sanctions in a given case. To code this dichotomous
variable, I draw information from the TIES data set. I code a case as multilateral if
TIES reports that the case involved more than one sender or an international institu-
tion. The data set includes 63 multilateral sanction cases and 407 unilateral sanction
cases. Here, I employ a Probit model to analyze the primary senders’ design choices.
5.5.1 Independent Variables
The hypotheses specify how characteristics of primary sender-target relationships or
characteristics of primary senders influence primary senders’ design choices. Testing
them requires an identification of which state is the primary sender in each sanction
case. I draw this information from the TIES data set, which defines a primary
sender as a “state that proposes sanctions, initiates the threat, or is responsible for
mobilizing other states to initiate sanctions.” Once primary senders are identified,
independent variables can be constructed. Below, I introduce how these variables
are operationalized and measured.
Value of Trade
Hypothesis 5.1 states that as the target’s valuation of the primary sender-target trade
relationship increases, multilateral sanctions are less likely to be chosen. To measure
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the extent to which the target values her trade relationship with the primary sender,
I code Trade Dependence. The logic behind the variable lies in the argument that
targets increasingly value trade with senders as the volume of that trade increases.
This variable is measured as the proportion of the volume of sender-target trade over
the target’s GDP from the year before sanctions started. To construct this variable,
data on countries’ GDP and bilateral trade volumes are drawn from Gleditsch (2002).
Ceteris paribus, higher target trade dependence should decreases the chance that the
primary sender chooses sanctioning multilaterally.
Di culty in Enforcing Unilateral Sanctions
Hypothesis 5.2 suggests that when it is more di cult to enforce his unilateral sanc-
tions, the primary sender is more likely to pursue sanctioning multilaterally. To
measure the extent to which the primary sender has di culty enforcing his uni-
lateral sanctions, I focus on the variable Distance, which is the natural log of the
capital-to-capital distance between the sender and target. As argued in Chapter
4, this variable relies on the claim in the trade literature that greater distance be-
tween countries means fewer firms engage in trade between those countries (e.g.
Melitz 2003, Bernard et al. 2007, Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein 2008). As fewer
firms are involved in trade between the primary sender and the target, it should be
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easier for the primary sender to monitor these firms’ behavior. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, a shorter primary sender-target distance should increase the di culty of
enforcing unilateral sanctions, which in turn increases the chance that the primary
sender chooses multilateral sanctions over unilateral ones.
Primary Sender’s Wealth
According to Hypothesis 5.4, wealthier states are more likely to pursue multilateral
sanctions. To test this hypothesis, I prepared a variable Primary Sender’s GDP, which
is the natural log of the primary sender’s GDP. To construct this variable, data on
countries’ GDP are drawn from Gleditsch (2002). We expect that, ceteris paribus,
the wealthier the primary sender, the more likely he imposes sanctions multilaterally.
E↵ective Bureaucracy
Hypothesis 5.5 states that a primary sender with an e↵ective bureaucracy is more
likely to sanction multilaterally. I prepared an independent variable, E↵ective Bu-
reaucracy, to test this hypothesis. I use an aggregate measure of bureaucratic quality
from the International Country Risk Guide data set, which measures e↵ectiveness
on a scale from 1 to 4 on the basis of expert surveys (4 means a good quality and 1
poor quality). This bureaucratic quality variable measures the strength and expertise
of bureaucrats and their professionalism and e ciency in each country. The use of
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ICRG data may not be ideal because the information in the data is not specific to the
enforcement agencies for sanction policies. However, given that many bureaucratic
agencies often get involved in sanctions enforcement and also most countries do not
even have specific agencies for enforcing sanctions, I believe the data from ICRG
largely capture the sender’s ability to enforce sanctions. Ceteris paribus, E↵ective
Bureaucracy should increase the chance that the primary sender chooses to sanction
multilaterally rather than unilaterally.
5.6 Empirical Results II
The empirical results regarding Hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5 are summarized
in Figure 5.2. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses. Concerning
Hypothesis 5.1, the coe cient on the Trade Dependence is negative as predicted and
statistically significant. This suggests that when the target values her trade with the
primary sender, multilateral sanctions are less likely to be imposed. This evidence
supports the theoretical result that primary senders do not pursue multilateralism
when unilateral sanctions are enough to change targets’ policy behavior.
Concerning Hypothesis 5.2, the coe cient on the Distance variable is negative
and statistically significant, which is consistent with the expectation. This result
implies that as the enforcement of unilateral sanctions become di cult, the primary
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Figure 5.2 : Coe cients from Probit Regression of Primary Sender’s Design
Choice: The graph shows the regression coe cients from the estimated model (N
= 533). Circles show the point estimates, and horizontal line segments associated
with circles show the 95% confidence intervals. The coe cient on the intercept is
omitted (↵ =  5.22, s.d. = 1.52).
sender is more likely to resort to multilateral sanctions.
The coe cient on the Primary Sender’s GDP variable is positive and statistically
significant as predicted. This finding supports Hypothesis 5.4 and suggests that as
the primary sender becomes wealthier, he is more likely to sanction multilaterally
rather than unilaterally. Because wealthy states can provide concessions big enough
to secure cooperation from other states and also can help enforce multilateral sanc-
tions, they are more likely to pursue building sanctioning coalitions.
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Finally, the coe cient on the E↵ective Bureaucracy is positive and statistically
related to the likelihood of primary senders choosing multilateral sanctions. This
finding implies that states with e↵ective bureaucracies are able to build and maintain
e↵ective multilateral coalitions by helping other states enforce their sanctions, which
increases the chance that they pursue sanctioning multilaterally.
Examining the substantive e↵ects of the variables not only confirms the conclu-
sions that have been drawn so far but also demonstrates how important these factors
are in determining primary senders’ design choices. The four panels in Figure 5.3
represent the e↵ects of each independent variable on the predicted probability of the
primary senders’ choices. The top-left panel suggests that having an e↵ective bu-
reaucracy increases the baseline probability of multilateral sanctions by about 10%,
on average. This e↵ect is quite strong, as are the e↵ects of the other variables in
this figure. In the top-right panel, the e↵ect of distance is a steady decrease in
the probability of interest. In the bottom-left panel, the e↵ect of the trade depen-
dence decreases rapidly in the range between 0% and 20% from 30% to 0%, which
is a strong e↵ect. In the bottom-right panel, the e↵ect of primary senders’ wealth
increases from 2.5% to 20%, which is again quite significant.
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Figure 5.3 : Predicted Substantive E↵ects on the Probability that Primary
Sender Chooses Multilateral Sanctions: Each panel presents the 95% confi-
dence band of the e↵ect of each respective variable on the probability that a threat
succeeds. The 95% confidence interval at each incremental step is based on 1,000
simulations. All other variables are held at their medians.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analyzed states’ choices between unilateral and multilateral
sanctions from an enforcement perspective. Two primary conclusions can be drawn.
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First, primary senders’ design choices are influenced by the extent to which they are
able to enforce unilateral as well as multilateral sanctions. When unilateral sanc-
tions are expected to be enforceable and costly enough for targets to give in, primary
senders choose unilateral sanctions. If not, they consider the option of multilateral
sanctions; but, it is di cult and costly to get other states to cooperate and enforce
their sanction policies. Thus, primary senders who have the capacity to help enforce
other states’ domestic enforcement activities are the ones who are expected to pur-
sue multilateral sanctions. Because enforcing unilateral and multilateral sanctions
require similar sets of skills and expertise, these two results imply that states with
strong enforcement capability are those that can e↵ectively use economic sanctions
as a foreign policy tool.
The second implication of the theory has to do with the e↵ectiveness of multilat-
eral sanctions. The sender’s design choices posited here suggest a kind of selection
e↵ect, which has not been addressed in the literature. Recent evidence suggests that
multilateral sanctions are indeed more e↵ective than unilateral sanctions. The tradi-
tional interpretation of this evidence is that multilateral sanctions are more e↵ective
because they impose greater costs on the target (Miers & Morgan 2002, Bapat &
Morgan 2009, McLean & Whang 2010). While my argument is not inconsistent with
this line of reasoning, my theory also suggests that senders strategically choose to
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sanction multilaterally only when they expect multilateral sanctions to work and
when they are capable of maintaining e↵ective coalitions. Given that it is costlier
to sanction multilaterally than unilaterally, senders must be careful when choosing
between the two.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes what has been learned about economic sanctions from the
enforcement perspective. It first reviews the theoretical arguments and summarizes
their predictions and performance against the empirical record. These conclusions
have ramifications for the study and practice of economic sanction policies. This
chapter concludes by a brief discussion of the limitations of this study and where
future works should go.
This study started with the premise that firms, not states, carry out sanction poli-
cies. I argued that firms’ decisions to evade sanction policies not only undermine the
e↵ectiveness of sanctions, but also have an important influence on states’ decisions
and the outcomes of sanction processes. While existing studies have focused on the
importance of sender-target trade as a crucial determinant of sanctions e↵ectiveness,
I have argued that sanctions may not lead to a disruption of the sender-target trade
relationship because firms may or may not comply with sanction policies. This is
why the model introduced here shows firms’ compliance with sanction policies is also
a necessary condition for sanctions success, in addition to the importance of trade
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relationships. Firms’ compliance behavior also has an important, and surprising,
e↵ect on the senders’ decisions. Senders are more likely to impose sanctions when
they anticipate firms’ non-compliance. This is because, once threats fail and the
chance of sanctions success is small, senders are more concerned about saving their
reputations without losing trade. They can achieve these goals simultaneously when
firms actually evade sanction policies and continue trading. The empirical evidence
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 provide fairly strong support for these novel theoretical
results.
This study investigates another important decision that senders make in sanction
episodes, namely the decision to impose sanctions multilaterally or unilaterally. The
main theory presented in Chapter 2 was primarily concerned with states’ decisions
in unilateral sanctions cases, but senders can possibly pursue imposing sanctions
multilaterally. The expectations about the enforcement of sanctions matter for the
sender’s decision to go forward unilaterally or multilaterally. In particular, when the
enforcement of unilateral sanctions is anticipated to be di cult, senders are more
likely to choose multilateral sanctions. However, imposing multilateral sanctions is
also expensive and di cult because their enforcement relies on other states’ will-
ingness to participate and their enforcement capabilities. When states have enough
resources and the bureaucratic capability to help other states enforce their sanctions,
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they are more likely pursue a multilateral path. The empirical evidence in Chapter
5 buttresses these theoretical results.
In total, this study has highlighted the importance of incorporating expectations
about enforcement into a full understanding of the sanctions processes and including
firms as an additional, key actor in international interactions between states. The
clear implication here is that states’ ability to influence firms’ decisions at home as
well as abroad is a crucial determinant of whether they impose sanctions, how they
design sanction policies, as well as sanctions e↵ectiveness.
So far, I have summarized the main results that emerged from this work. Yet, how
successful has this study been in filling the gap identified in the existing literature?
How has the knowledge generated in this study advanced the existing knowledge of
economic sanctions?
In Chapter 1, I argued that the recent approaches in the literature to look more
deeply into domestic processes behind sanction policy making are promising, but
they fall short in two areas. First, these recent theories have seldom been subjected
to empirical scrutiny. Second, these new perspectives have not shed light on how do-
mestic concerns about sanction policies influence international interactions between
states. To address these two issues simultaneously, this study has incorporated firms
as a key actor in the strategic environment between a sender and target and explored
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the resulting testable implications for sanctions decisions.
More specifically, building on a bargaining approach utilized by prior work, this
study has incorporated enforcement as a key part of sanction processes and o↵ered
a more complete and logically consistent theory. The model explicitly specified and
convincingly demonstrated how the enforcement of sanctions and firms’ compliance
behavior are linked to states’ decisions and the outcomes of sanctions. The theoretical
results have been substantiated empirically with quantitative data.
This study has generated several novel insights which have not been appreciated
before. At first glance, it appears that factors such as sanctioning states’ bureaucratic
quality or ownership of firms are unrelated to economic sanctions. By including the
enforcement of sanctions as a part of sanction processes, the theoretical perspective
o↵ers ways to connect these seemingly unrelated factors to various aspects of sanc-
tions, sometimes in a surprising way. A key finding has been that states’ ability
to enforce sanctions crucially increases the e↵ectiveness of sanctions, but counter-
intuitively decreases the likelihood that they impose sanctions at the same time.
The theory provides a logically consistent explanation for these apparently paradox-
ical findings. Also, the theory explains the means by which the characteristics of
firms and the sender-target trade relationship are related to di↵erent outcomes of
sanctions. The study therefore o↵ers a novel and empirically corroborated theoret-
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ical perspective. Even purely empirically, the project also makes a contribution by
discovering several new determinants of sanction outcomes.
The conclusions from this study directly speak to policy debates about the en-
forcement of sanction policies. Policy makers as well as scholars often suggest that
a lack of e↵ective enforcement is an explanation for why sanctions often fail (e.g.
de Fiedorowicz 1936, Paul & Akhtar 2009). Indeed, states do not appear to be
fully committed to enforcing sanctions. Most countries, with the exception of the
United States, do not have specific enforcement agencies for economic sanctions.
Even in the United States, OFAC does not appear to be aggressive about going after
transgressors of sanction policies. For example, they reported only twenty-one and
sixteen violation cases in 2011 and 2012.1 These numbers are strikingly low, given
the agency is enforcing sanctions against sixteen di↵erent targets and more than
6,000 corporations and individuals. These observations are consistent with some
new empirical evidence provided by Early (2012), suggesting that firms often evade
sanction policies.
Should this be taken as an evidence that governments do not take sanctions
seriously and thus sanctions fail? But if this is true, why would governments continue
imposing sanctions? The theory presented in this study provides a fresh look at
1 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/2012.aspx
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this puzzling behavior of states. Observationally, states do not appear to enforce
sanctions vigorously because senders impose sanctions when they expect firms’ non-
compliance. Sender states do this because they want to save their reputations without
losing trade with targets.
However, the theory suggests that we should not be pessimistic about the use-
fulness and e↵ectiveness of economic sanctions just because they do not seem to
be enforced. Even though senders do not appear to be serious about enforcement,
findings in this study show that sanctions can change a target’s policy when senders
have the ability to enforce sanctions.
As it stands, the project outlined here has many shortcomings and limitations
that need to be addressed; however, it clearly provides some insights and directions
for future research. First, the most obvious direction is to derive more empirical
implications from the present theory and test them against data. There are several
comparative statics predictions from the model that have not been explored in detail
here. For example, exploring firms’ cost of evading sanctions, such as extra costs for
transshipping goods through third-party states, can lead to a host of factors that
can potentially influence outcomes of sanctions. Such an exercise would not only
generate more insights about the conditions under which sanctions are imposed and
succeed, but also point to where the theory needs to be modified.
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The second venue for future research explores another channel through which
firms can possibly influence states’ decisions in sanction episodes. This study has
focused on firms’ decisions to comply with sanction policies, but they can also lobby
politicians against imposing sanctions. Rather than simply lobbying against the
impositions of sanctions, firms may also attempt to influence the design of sanctions
so that they will not be a↵ected. To what extent do firms’ lobbying activities impact
sanction decisions and e↵ectiveness? If their lobbying activities make a di↵erence,
at which stage in the sanctions process do they exert influence? What are the
characteristics of firms and industries that are important in determining the success
of firms’ lobbying e↵orts? Answering these questions requires a new theoretical model
and testing such a model calls for new information about the design of sanctions,
such as which specific industries are targeted by sanction policies.
Third, it is also important to acknowledge that this study has focused only
on trade sanctions and set aside possible implementation problems in other types
of economic sanctions, such as termination of aid transfers and travel bans. At
first glance, such an analysis may look simple. For example, aid terminations may
be easy for sanctioning governments to implement because terminating aid trans-
fers does not have to be carried out by subnational actors. However, aid is often
given to other states in exchange for some policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita &
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Smith 2009, Heinrich N.d.), which should make it more di cult to terminate without
policy implications. Furthermore, I also did not address a more complicated prob-
lem regarding a state’s choice between di↵erent forms of sanctions. Investigations
into these questions would certainly enrich the current understanding of economic
sanctions.
This study also provides a fruitful direction for research beyond the sanctions
literature. Broadly speaking, this study showcases the importance of studying the
implementation aspect of foreign policy instruments. By focusing on the very actor
who carries out sanction policies, the theory presented here suggests that concerns
about policy implementation have an important influence on policy e↵ectiveness as
well as states’ decisions to use and design such policies. Investigations into the
implementation of other foreign policy instruments would similarly be fruitful. For
example, foreign aid policies are often carried out by non-state actors such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). In light of recent findings that the practice
of giving foreign aid is a belligerent policy tool (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita & Smith
2009), it is likely that the preferences of NGOs are not the same as those of donor
governments. Understanding how NGOs’ inclusion in the aid process influences
states’ decisions to provide foreign aid and how those decisions influence NGOs would
be an interesting question for IR scholarship as well as an important contribution to
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the aid literature and to the evaluation of comparative foreign policy tools.
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